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The meaning of “property” in a constitutional sense is a globally contested concept. As a result, 
various jurisdictions have adopted varying approaches to defining the meaning of this concept. 
Consequently, different conclusions have been reached with regard to the even more controversial 
issue of the inclusion of public law entitlements within the ambit of constitutional property.  
 
Like in other foreign jurisdictions, the South African courts had no difficulties when dealing with 
the inclusion of rights and interests already protected as “property” under private law within the 
constitutional definition of problem. Challenges only arose when the court had to extend the ambit 
of constitutional property beyond the rights and interests protected under private law. In much of 
the cases, unfortunately, the Courts extended the constitutional concept of property without fully 
explaining the reasons for such a decision, in a manner that would give certainty of outcomes in 
future cases.  
 
The Shoprite Checkers case, was the first case, in which the Constitutional Court engaged fully 
with the meaning of constitutional property, and even went on to decide that constitutional 
protection of property extends to commercial licences which are public law entitlements. 
 
This dissertation will critically analyse the constitutional concept of property in light of the 
Shoprite Checkers case. It will question whether the Constitutional Court was correct to extend 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
  Background 
 
The right to property is guaranteed in section 25 of the Constitution.1 Given the contested nature 
of property, and especially land rights in South Africa, it is not surprising that this is a particularly 
complex provision. It consists of nine subsections. The first three subsections are aimed at 
protecting existing property rights,2 while the remaining six subsections are aimed at transforming 
South Africa’s system of land law.3 
 
The first three subsections read as follows: 
 
(1) “No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application –  
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been 
agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3)  The amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all the 
relevant circumstances, including –  
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital investment of the 
property; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.”4 
 
These three subsections give rise to a number of complex and difficult issues. One of these is what 
is meant by the constitutional concept of “property”. This is a particularly important issue, because 
a person may rely on the protection provided by sections 25(1) to (3) only if he or she can show 
                                                          
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 See sections 25(1) to (3), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3 See sections 25(4) to (9), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
4 See sections 25(1) to (9), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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that the right or object in question falls within the ambit of what the Constitution recognises as 
“property”. In other words, the constitutional concept of “property” functions as a gate which must 
be opened before a person can claim the rights set out in sections 25(1) to (3).5 
 
The gatekeeping role that is played by the constitutional concept of “property” is clearly illustrated 
by the section 25 analysis adopted by the Constitutional Court in its seminal judgment in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service.6 This 
analysis consists of the following questions: 
 
“(a)  Does that which is taken away by the operation of the legislation amount to ‘property’ for the purpose of 
section 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the relevant authority? 
(c) If so, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of section 25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under section 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If so, does it amount to expropriation for the purpose of section 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the deprivation comply with the requirements of section 25(2)(a) and (b) 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36?”7 
 
As such, when determining whether a statute or statutory provision has infringed section 25 of the 
Constitution, a court must always begin by asking whether the interest that has been affected 
amounts to property for the purposes of section 25 (question (a)). If the answer to this question is 
yes, only then can the court go on to consider the remaining questions (questions (b) to (g)) and 
ultimately determine whether the statute or statutory provision is valid or not. If the answer to this 
question is no, the court cannot go on to consider the remaining questions. Instead, it must find 
that the statute or statutory provision is valid, at least insofar as section 25 is concerned. 
 
In order to resolve a constitutional property dispute, it is important for the court to interpret the 
meaning of “property” for the purposes of section 25. The Constitution does not, however, offer 
much assistance in this regard as it does not expressly define “property” and neither does it provide 
                                                          
5 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
6 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
7 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
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any express guidelines for defining this concept. Fortunately, this lack of a definition within the 
Constitution does not usually give rise to any problems where real rights (ownership and limited 
real rights) in corporeal objects (things) are concerned.8 This is because real rights in corporeal 
objects have always been defined as property in South African private law and it is generally 
accepted that the constitutional definition of property should not be narrower than the private law 
definition.9 
 
The Constitutional Court has accordingly found that several traditional property rights are 
protected within the constitutional concept of property. In the leading case, First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service10 the Constitutional Court 
stated that these interests form the foundation of the constitutional concept of property.11 It went 
on to hold that the ownership of corporeal movables and immovables fall into the definition of 
constitutional property. In line with this finding, in Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy,12 the Constitutional Court also found that mineral rights fall into the definition of 
constitutional property and in Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC13 the Cape High Court also 
held that a registered praedial servitude is constitutional property.14  
 
Apart from ownership and limited real rights, the Constitutional Court has held that other private 
law rights such as intellectual property rights and personal rights should be recognised as 
constitutional property. Thus, the constitutional concept of property has been extended to include 
intellectual property rights such as a trademark,  Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 
(Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae),15 
                                                          
8 M Chaskalson & C Lewis “Property” in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 1ed (1996) at 31-6. 
9 AJ Van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) at 114. 
10  First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 51. See also Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) at para 33; Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) 
at para 54; and Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government and Another [2009] ZACC 24; 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC); 2010 (1) BCLR 61 (CC) at para 33. 
11 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 51. 
12 [2013] ZACC 9; 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC); 2013 (7) BCLR 727 (CC) at para 50. 
13 2003 (2) SA 136 (C). 
14 Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C). 
15 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression 
Institute as Amicus Curiae) [2005] ZACC 7; 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC); 2005(8) BCLR 743 (CC) at para 17. 
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and personal rights arising from unjustified enrichment, National Credit Regulator v Opperman.16 
Although the Constitutional Court was in these cases stretching the concept of constitutional 
property beyond the scope of the private law notion of property, it did not however fully engage 
with the issue of property by clarifying the reasons for the inclusion of such interests.17 Instead, 
the Constitutional Court was happy to assume that these interest qualify for protection as 
constitutional property.  
 
The Constitutional Court in its recent judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Economic Development, Eastern Cape18 unlike earlier cases, actually dealt with the issue of 
property comprehensively. In this case a plurality of the Court accepted that a grocer’s wine licence 
should be recognised as constitutional property. Apart from the fact that this is the first judgment 
in which the Constitutional Court has engaged fully with the meaning of the concept of 
constitutional property, it is also the first judgment in which the Court has accepted that the 
constitutional definition of property also encompasses interests derived from public law.  
 
Although a plurality of the Constitutional Court accepted that a grocer’s wine licence falls within 
the ambit of the constitutional concept of property, the grounds on which the Court arrived at this 
decision differed quite starkly.  
 
In his main judgment, Froneman J held that a grocer’s wine licence is indeed property protected 
by the constitution.19 In arriving at this conclusion, he was of the view that the meaning of property 
must be sought within the Constitution itself and that the constitutional values must play a key role 
in this regard (values-based approach)20. In dealing with the facts at hand, Froneman J formulated 
                                                          
16 [2012] ZACC 29; 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2013 (2) BCLR 170 (CC) at para 61. See also Phumelela Gaming and 
Leisure Ltd v Grundlingh [2006] ZACC 6; 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC) and Law Society of South Africa v Minister of 
Transport [2010] ZACC 25; 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC); 2011 (2) BCLR 170 (CC) at para 84. 
17 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) at 536. See also Phumelela Gaming and Leisure 
Limited v Grundlingh [2006] ZACC 6; 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC) and Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 
(Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) [2005] ZACC 7; 2006 
(1) SA 144 (CC); 2005(8) BCLR 743 (CC) 
18 [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC). 
19  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 70. 
20 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 
(CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 36, 44 and 46. 
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an objective test which seeks to establish a close connection between the interest and the holders’ 
right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession as well as their dignity.21 This approach has 
been criticised for diminishing the right to property by requiring that an interest should affect other 
constitutional rights before it can be regarded as falling within the ambit of the constitutional 
definition of property.22 
 
In his concurring judgment, Madlanga J adopted a private law style approach. He was of the view 
that if the interest has characteristics of property then the court should not “shy away” from finding 
that it is indeed constitutional property. Madlanga J therefore assessed the characteristics of the 
Grocer’s Wine License and found that, it is; something in hand, has commercial value, can be 
transferred, may endure indefinitely and it cannot be cancelled or suspended at whim.23 He also 
argued that if something as tenuous as an enrichment claim which can only be enforced against a 
specific party and which can be brought to court and successfully defended was deemed property 
without hesitation, then logic dictates that a grocer’s wine licence should also qualify as 
“property”.24 Madlanga J’s approach has been criticised for justifying the extension of the 
constitutional concept of property to interest not protected under private law on a private law 
principles of conceiving of property.25 
 
Finally, it is also important to note that in his dissenting judgment Moseneke DCJ held that a 
grocer’s wine licence does not fall within the ambit and scope of the constitutional concept of 
property. In arriving at this conclusion, Moseneke DCJ expressed the view that it was unnecessary 
for the court to determine the complex issue of property in this case.26 He reasoned that not only 
was this a difficult issue, but the inclusion of commercial licenses within the constitutional concept 
                                                          
21 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 
(CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 61. 
22 P Olivier “Property yields to purpose: Shoprite Checkers v MEC” African Legal Centre 6 July 2015 
http://africanlegalcentre.org/2015/07/06/piet-olivier-property-yields-to-purpose-shoprite-checkers-v-mec/, accessed 
18 August 2016. 
23 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 
(CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 143. 
24 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 
(CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 142. 
25 T Roux and D Davis “Property” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law: 
The Bill of Rights (2015) at 20-18.  
26 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 
(CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 94. 
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of property would interfere with the states’ constitutional duty of regulating the liquor industry.27 
The approach taken by Moseneke DCJ has been criticised for totally avoiding the question of 
whether or not the grocer’s wine licence falls within the ambit of the constitutional concept of 
property and confusing the “concept of property with when it is acceptable to interfere with 
property”.28 
 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to critically analyse the constitutional concept of property 
in light of the different approaches adopted by the Constitutional Court in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape.29 More specifically, the purpose of this 
thesis is to argue that it was unnecessary for the Constitutional Court to extend the constitutional 
concept of property to include grocer’s wine licences for a variety of reasons, but most importantly 
because the interest of the licence holders are protected by other more appropriate provisions of 
the Constitution, namely the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession guaranteed in 
section 22 of the Constitution, in the case of citizens, and the principle of legality which is an 
aspect of the rule of law, in the case of non-citizens and juristic persons. 
 
   Research question     
 
As pointed out above, the purpose of this thesis is to critically analyse the constitutional concept 
of property in light of the different approaches adopted by the Constitutional Court in Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape.30 More specifically, the 
purpose of this thesis is to argue that it was unnecessary for the Constitutional Court to extend the 
constitutional concept of property to include grocer’s wine licences for a variety of reasons, but 
most importantly because the interest of the licence holders are protected by other more appropriate 
provisions of the Constitution, namely the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession 
guaranteed in section 22 of the Constitution, in the case of citizens, and the principle of legality 
which is an aspect of the rule of law, in the case of non-citizens and juristic persons. 
                                                          
27 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
(CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 120. 
28 P Olivier “Property yields to purpose: Shoprite Checkers v MEC” African Legal Centre 6 July 2015 
http://africanlegalcentre.org/2015/07/06/piet-olivier-property-yields-to-purpose-shoprite-checkers-v-mec/, accessed 
18 August 2016. 
29 [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC). 




Before making this argument, however, this thesis will: (a) set out and discuss the manner in which 
the Constitutional Court has interpreted and applied sections 25(1) and (2) of the Constitution; (b) 
set out and discuss the different approaches adopted in the Shoprite Checker’s case; and (c) 
compare and contrast the different approaches adopted in the Shoprite Checkers case with the 
approach adopted in comparable foreign jurisdictions, namely the European Union, Germany and 
the United States of America. The approach adopted in each of these jurisdictions was considered 
by the Court itself in its judgment in Shoprite Checkers. 
 
  Research methodology 
 
This is a qualitative study. As such, it is based largely on a critical analysis of primary and 
secondary legal materials in order to identify contradictions, inconsistencies, lacunae and trends 
in the relevant field. The primary and secondary materials that will be analysed in this study 
include statutes and law reports. In addition, they also include books, chapters in books journal 
articles, reports and internet websites. 
 
  Rationale for study 
 
The motivation for this study is the need for conceptual clarity with regard to the constitutional 
concept of property. This is essential because the question of property is not only the threshold 
question in a constitutional property dispute but it is also a point at which the case can be resolved. 
Therefore, a clearer understanding of the constitutional concept of property is pivotal to the 
protection of the right of property. Furthermore, clarity would assist in the adjudication of property 
claims and the protection of property holders from arbitrary deprivation and unlawful 
expropriation and thereby further the constitutional goals of social transformation and economic 
security. 
 
  Structure of the study 
 




Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The general background, the research questions, the research methodology, the rationale for the 
study and structure of the study will be set out in chapter one. 
 
Chapter Two: The constitutional property clause 
 
The manner in which the Constitutional Court has interpreted and applied sections 25(1) and (2) 
will be set out in discussed in chapter two. This chapter will focus specifically on the manner in 
which the Court has interpreted and applied the following concepts: “deprivation”, “non-
arbitrariness”, “expropriation” and “public purpose/public interest”. 
 
Chapter Three: The property concept prior to Shoprite Checkers 
 
The manner in which the constitutional concept of property was interpreted and applied by courts, 
and especially the Constitutional Court, prior to its judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v 
MEC for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape will be set 
out and discussed in chapter three. 
 
Chapter Four: The property concept in Shoprite Checkers 
 
The judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 
will be set out and discussed in detail in chapter four. The different approaches adopted by 
Froneman J, Madlanga J and Moseneke DCJ will also be highlighted. 
 
Chapter Five: Comparative jurisprudence 
 
The manner in which the European Court on Human Rights, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States of America have interpreted and applied the 
constitutional concept of property in their respective jurisdictions will be set out and discussed in 




Chapter Six: Analysis and conclusion 
 
The decision to extend the constitutional concept of property to include grocer’s wine licences will 
be critically analysed in chapter six. As a part of this critical analysis it will be argued that it was 
unnecessary for the Constitutional Court to extend the constitutional concept of property to include 
grocer’s wine licences because the interests of grocer’s wine licence holders are protected in 
section 22 of the Constitution for South African citizens and under the principle of legality for 























CHAPTER TWO: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 
 
   Introduction 
 
The system of apartheid was introduced in South Africa by the National Party following its 
victory in the 1948 general election.31 As its name suggests, this system was aimed at 
segregating South Africans, not only on an economic, political and social basis, but also on a 
territorial basis.32 In order to achieve the territorial segregation of South Africans, the apartheid 
government enacted a vast number of statutes. Among the most notorious were the Black Land 
Acts33 and the Group Areas Acts.34  
 
These laws dispossessed black South Africans of their land and transferred ownership to the 
white minority. As a result of this process, black South Africans were eventually confined to 
13% of the land even though they constituted 80% of the population.35 The loss of land was 
accompanied by a loss of livestock and other forms of wealth. These losses drove the majority of 
black South Africans into poverty and created a pool of cheap migrant labour. The labour system 
created by this process ultimately resulted in a break down in community and family structures.36  
 
Given this history, it is not surprising that the process of negotiating and drafting a constitutional 
property clause proved to be a difficult task. Although both the African National Congress (the 
“ANC”) and the National Party (the “NP”) agreed that the right to property should be protected 
in a post-apartheid constitution, each party had a different goal in mind. The ANC wanted to 
ensure that the socio-economic transformation of South Africa would not be frustrated by the 
                                                          
31 C Cachalia and M Suttner Long walk to freedom (1998) 27. 
32 History.com “Apartheid” (2010). Available at www.history.com/topics/apartheid/2010, accessed on 25 August 
2016. 
33 Black (Native) Land Act 27 of 1913 and Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. 
34 Act 41 of 1950. This Act was repealed and replaced by the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957 which in turn was 
repealed and replaced by the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. 
35 M Chaskalson and C Lewis “Property” in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) at 
31-2. 
36 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) at para 4.14.1. 
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constitutional protection of individual property holder,37 while the NP wanted to protect 
individual property holders from being dispossessed of their existing property rights.38 
 
In order to reconcile these conflicting goals, both parties made important concessions and these 
concessions are reflected in the provisions of section 28 of the Interim Constitution and 
especially section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
Section 28 of the Interim Constitution appears to have been modelled partly on Article 14 of the 
German Basic Law.39 Like Article 14(1), section 28(1) expressly guaranteed the institution of 
private property. It provided in this respect that “[e]very person shall have the right to acquire 
and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the nature of the rights permit, to dispose of 
such rights”.40 Apart from guaranteeing the institution of private property, section 28 also 
distinguished between the deprivation and expropriation of property. Section 28(2) stated in this 
respect that “[n]o deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in 
accordance with a law”,41 and section 28(3) that “[w]here any rights in property are expropriated 
. . . , such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the 
payment of agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and 
within such period as may be determined by a court of law as just and equitable”.42 Provisions 
dealing with land reform were, however, not included in the property clause. Instead, they were 
                                                          
37 M Chaskalson and C Lewis “Property” in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) at 
31-2. 
38 M Chaskalson and C Lewis “Property” in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) at 
31-2. 
39 Article 14 of the German Basic Law reads as follows: “(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be 
guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws. (2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also 
serve the public good. (3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be ordered by or 
pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by 
establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case of dispute 
concerning the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts”. 
40 See section 28(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
41 See section 28(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
42 See section 28(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. Apart from declaring that 
compensation must be “just and equitable, section 28(3) also provided that just and equitable compensation must be 
determined by “taking into account all relevant factors, including, in the case of the determination of compensation, 
the use to which the property is being put, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value of the 
investments in it by those affected and the interests of those affected”. 
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included in the equality clause (s 8(3)(b))43 and in an entirely separate part of the Interim 
Constitution (ss 121 to 123).44 
 
Although the positive guarantee of property rights contained in section 28(1) of the Interim 
Constitution was not retained in section 25 of the Constitution,45 the distinction drawn by 
sections 28(2) and (3) between deprivations and expropriations was. Section 25(1) provides in 
this respect that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”,46 and section 25(2) that 
“property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application (a) for a public 
purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the 
time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court”.47 Section 25(3) goes on to state that “[t]he amount of compensation and 
the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable reflecting an equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interest of those affected”.48 
 
Section 25 does not only protect the right to private property, but also makes provision for a 
system of land reform in sections 25(5) – (9). With respect to land rights, the property clause in 
section 25(5) directs that “the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
                                                          
43 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. This section stipulated that, “Every person or 
community dispossessed of rights in land before the commencement of this Constitution under any law which would 
have been inconsistent with subsection (2) had that subsection been in operation at the time of the dispossession, 
shall be entitled to claim restitution of such rights subject to and in accordance with sections 121, 122 and 123.” 
44 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. Section 121 provided for the enactment of an 
Act of Parliament to deal with restitution of land rights. Section on the other hand 122 provided for the 
establishment of a Commission of Restitution of Land Rights and section 123 outlined the various orders the courts 
could make in land restitution matters. 
45 Although section 25 in the Constitution does not contain a positive guarantee of property rights, Chaskalson and 
Lewis point out that this does not pose any problems as the equality clause in the Constitution will ensure that there 
is no discrimination in this regard (see M Chaskalson and C Lewis “Property” in M Chaskalson et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) at 31-9). Moreover, in the First Certification case, the Constitutional 
Court confirmed that there is nothing odd about the lack of a positive guarantee of property rights as this is common 
in several democracies (see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC); 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para 72). 
46 See section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
47 See section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
48 See section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. When it comes to determining just 
and equitable compensation, section 25(3) provides that the courts must take into account all relevant circumstances 
including: (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition of the property; (c) the market value 
of the property; (d) the extent of the direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the property”. 
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its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis.” Section 6 provides for security of tenure or “comparable redress” to persons or 
communities whose land tenure is insecure because of racially discriminatory laws and section 8 
provides for the restitution of property or “equitable redress” where such property was 
expropriated after 19 June 1913. In section 8, the property clause also provides that “No 
provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36 (1).” Finally, in section 9, the Parliament is directed to enact 
legislation that deals with land reform issues.49  
 
When it comes to the resolution of a constitutional property dispute, before any other issues are 
dealt with, there should be a determination of whether or not the object, right or interest 
concerned falls within the constitutional definition of property. This gatekeeping role of the 
“property” question is clearly demonstrated by the section 25 analysis adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service.50 This analysis, which consists of a series of questions, reads as 
follows: 
 
“(a)  Does that which is taken away by operation of legislation amount to “property” for the purposes of section 
25? 
(b)  Has there been a deprivation of such property by the relevant authority? 
(c)  If so, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of section 25(1)? 
(d)  If not, is such deprivation justified under section 36 of the Constitution? 
(e)  If so, does it amount to expropriation for the purposes of section 25(2)? 
(f)  If so, does the deprivation comply with the requirements of section 25(2) (a) and (b)? 
(g)  If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36?”51 
 
                                                          
49 Land reform as envisaged by section 25 is much more extensive than the system envisaged by the Interim 
Constitution. 
50 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 51. 
51 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, Southern African Revenue Service [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 46. 
21 
 
As demonstrated by the First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service52 case, the resolution of a property dispute begins with determining 
whether the object, right or interest concerned falls within the scope and ambit of what the 
constitution deems as “property”. At this stage, if the answer is no, then one cannot claim 
constitutional protection. However, if the answer is yes, then we proceed to question (b) and ask 
whether there has been a deprivation of the object, right or interest concerned. If there has been a 
deprivation, then we go on to question (c) and examine whether the deprivation was carried out 
in a manner consistent with the provisions of section 25(1). Should it be the case that the 
deprivation does not comply with the provisions of section 25, then, according to question (d) 
one must go on and look into whether this lack of compliance can be justified through a section 
36 limitation clause analysis. 
 
If the deprivation does not comply with the provisions for a lawful deprivation and cannot be 
justified under section 36, then the enquiry would be concluded at this stage and the deprivation 
will be found to be unconstitutional and therefore invalid. However, where the deprivation is 
lawful, question (e) requires one to look into whether the deprivation can also be regarded as an 
expropriation. If that is so, then as per question (f), the expropriation must be tested against the 
section 25(2)(a) and (b) provisions for a lawful expropriation. However, if the expropriation fails 
to pass this test then as outlined in question (g), it must be tested against the section 36 limitation 
clause. Should the expropriation not be justifiable in terms of the limitation clause, then the 
expropriation in question will be deemed both unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
The property clause contains a number of key concepts, namely “property”, “deprivation, “non-
arbitrariness”, “expropriation” and “public purpose/public interest”. Apart from the concept of 
“property”, this chapter will focus on the manner in which each of these concepts has been 
interpreted and applied by South African courts. As Roux has explained, these concepts are 
particularly significant because the courts in South Africa and other jurisdictions have used them 
to strike a balance between the protection of private property and the interests of society. The 
concept of “property” will be dealt with separately in chapter three because it is the focus of this 
thesis.  Before turning to discuss the key concepts of the property clause, however, it will be 
                                                          
52  [2002] ZACC 5; 2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
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helpful to briefly discuss who is bound by the rights set out in the property clause and who is 
entitled to claim these rights. 
 
   The application of the property clause 
 
  Who is bound by the rights set out in the property clause? 
 
Section 8(1) of the Constitution expressly provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and 
binds all organs of the State.53 It, therefore, applies to all forms of law, including common law 
and customary law and is binding on the legislative, executive and judicial arms of government. 
The property clause is one of these rights. As such, it is binding on all law and all organs of the 
State. Apart from the state, section 8(2) provides that the Bill of Rights also binds natural and 
juristic persons (i.e. private persons), but only to the extent that it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the right.54   
 
Although there is no doubt that the property clause is binding on the State, it is not so clear 
whether it is also binding on private persons. This is partly because the Constitutional Court has 
held that the property clause is primarily “aimed at protecting private property rights against 
governmental action” and not against private action.55 In addition, the property clause authorises 
only those deprivations and/or expropriations that have been sanctioned by a law of general 
application and the concept of a law of general application does not include the actions of private 
actors.56  
 
Despite these arguments, it appears as though the property clause may be binding on private 
persons, at least in certain circumstances. In Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School 
v Essay NO,57 for example, the Constitutional Court held that the Bill of Rights imposes a 
negative obligation on private persons “not to interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a 
                                                          
53 See Section 8(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
54 See Section 8(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
55 Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security [2002] ZACC 26; 2003 (2) SA 34 (CC); 2003 (1) 
BCLR 14 (CC) at para 4. 
56 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) at 553 and 554. 
57 [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). 
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right” by another person.58 And in Daniels v Scribante and Another59 a majority of the Court 
went even further and held that the Bill of Rights may impose a positive obligation on a private 
parties, at least in some cases.60  
 
        Who is entitled to claim the protection of the property clause? 
 
When it comes to identifying those persons who are entitled to claim the protection of the 
property clause a distinction is sometimes drawn between natural and juristic persons. While 
there is no doubt that natural persons are entitled to claim the protection of the property clause,61 
the respondents in First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v The Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Service62 argued that juristic persons were not. The Court, 
however, rejected this argument.63 In arriving at its decision, the Court held that, although a 
company is an entity that exists separate to its shareholders “and its assets are its exclusive 
property”, the holders of shares are usually natural persons.64 As such, the constitutional 
protection of a juristic person’s property rights is essential as the rights afforded to a juristic 
person ultimately have an indirect bearing on a natural person.65 The property clauses’ protection 
of property rights therefore extends to property rights held by juristic persons. 
 
  The constitutional concept of a “deprivation” 
                                                          
58 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay N.O. and Others 2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 
761 (CC) at para 58. 
59 [2017] ZACC 13; 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC); 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC). 
60 Daniels v Scribante and Another [2017] ZACC 13; 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC); 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC) at para 39 
and 63. In order to determine whether the Bill of Rights does impose a positive obligation on a private person, the 
Constitutional Court held that a number of factors must be taken into account. These include the nature of the right, 
the history behind the right, the purpose of the right, how best that purpose can be achieved, the potential for a 
private person to invade the right and whether letting a private person off the hook would negate the essential 
content of the right. 
61 Section 7(1) of the Constitution states that the Bill of Rights “enshrines the rights of all people in our country”. 
Apart from confirming that natural persons are entitled to claim the protection of the Bill of Rights, the phrase “all 
people” also seems to suggest that the protection afforded by this clause extends to all natural persons regardless of 
whether or not they are citizens or residents of South Africa (see T Roux “Property” in S Woolman and M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2013) at 9). 
62 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
63 First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service and Another  [2002] ZACC 5; 2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 45. 
64 First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service and Another  [2002] ZACC 5; 2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702  (CC) at para 43. 
65 First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 




Having dealt with the issue of who is bound by the property clause and who is entitled to claim 
its protection, we may now turn to consider the constitutional concept of a deprivation. 
  
Once it has been determined that the object or interest concerned is constitutional property, the 
next step is to determine whether there has been a deprivation or expropriation, and if so, 
whether it was carried out in a lawful and legitimate manner. It is important to note that the 
property clause does not prohibit the deprivation of property per se. Instead, it implicitly gives 
authority to the State to carry out regulatory and expropriatory deprivations in line with its 
police-power and eminent domain functions. 
  
The State, therefore, is authorized to enact regulations with regard to the “use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of private property”.66 As such, where the State has carried out a deprivation or an 
expropriation in accordance with the provisions of section 25, this is regarded as a legitimate use 
of public power and the holder of a property right who has been deprived of their property will 
not be entitled to a remedy even where he or she has suffered a loss as a result of the regulatory 
or expropriatory deprivation.67 
 
In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service68 the Constitutional Court adopted a very wide approach to the concept of a deprivation. 
In casu, the Court defined this concept as “any interference with the use, enjoyment or 
exploitation of private property”. The Court further clarified that constitutional deprivation of 
property does not refer to an actual “taking away” of property, instead, any intrusion with regard 
to a property holder’s rights to use, enjoy and exploit private property will suffice.69  
 
Unfortunately, the broad and simple approach adopted in First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service, was undermined by the 
                                                          
66 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 214. 
67 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 214-215. 
68 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
69 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC)  at para 57. 
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Constitutional Court in it subsequent judgment in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality.70 After expressly stating that it would apply the wide definition formulated in First 
National Bank, the Court unexpectedly formulated a much narrower definition. In terms of the 
narrow definition, the Court held that an interference must be “substantial” and it should “go 
beyond the normal restrictions on property use and enjoyment found in an open and democratic 
society”. An important consequence of this approach is that the mere fact that there was an 
interference may not be sufficient to constitute a deprivation on its own.  
 
It seems that the Constitutional Court in adopting a narrow approach, wanted to avoid a situation 
whereby even insubstantial interferences with property rights would qualify as deprivations and 
as a result stand in the way of the States’ regulatory function. Van der Walt, however, criticizes 
the narrow definition, arguing that it serves no useful purpose to qualify deprivations as the 
purpose of the property clause is not only to protect property holders from “excessive regulation, 
but also to authorise and control normal regulation” as was the case in First National Bank of 
South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service.71 He further 
argues that limiting deprivation to that which exceeds what is “normal in an open and democratic 
society” renders section 25(1) redundant as courts do not need this particular clause to strike 
down undemocratic legislation.72  
 
Following its judgment in Mkontwana, the Constitutional Court vacillated between the wide and 
narrow definitions. In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and 
Works, Gauteng Provincial Government,73 for example, the Court followed the wide definition.74 
In arriving at this decision, it referred with approval to the criticisms O’Regan J levelled against 
the narrow definition in her concurring judgment in Mkontwana.75 Despite doing so, however, 
                                                          
70 [2004] ZACC 9; 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) the case concerned a constitutional challenge 
to a statute which prevented owners of immovable property from alienating their property unless they had been 
issued with a certificate from the municipality. This certificate had the purpose of showing that they had paid their 
consumption charges for up to two years before the date of issue. 
71 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC); see also A J Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 3ed (2011) at 205. 
72 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 205. 
73 [2009] ZACC 24; 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC); 2010 (1) BCLR 61 (CC). 
74 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
and Another [2009] ZACC 24; 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC); 2010 (1) BCLR 61 (CC) at para 34 and 38. 
75 [2004] ZACC 9; 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
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the Court reverted back to the narrow definition in its subsequent judgment in Offit Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd.76 In this case the Court stated that it 
would follow the narrow approach set out in Mkontwana although confusingly it did not appear 
to do so when it applied the law to the facts of the matter.77 
 
Fortunately, the confusion generated by these conflicting judgments appears to have been 
resolved by the Constitutional Court in its most recent pronouncements on this issue, namely 
South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy78 and 
Jordaan and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.79 In South African Diamond 
Producers Organisation the Court held that the narrow approach must be followed. In arriving at 
this decision, the Court held that “there will be a deprivation only where the interference is 
‘substantial’ – meaning that the intrusion must be so extensive that it has a legally relevant 
impact on the rights of the affected party.”80 And in Jordaan81 the Court confirmed that 
deprivations are limited to substantial interferences. In arriving at this decision, the Court held 
that a constitutionally significant deprivation of property will take place “only where the 
interference with property rights is “substantial” – meaning that the extent of the intrusion must 
be extensive to have a legally significant impact on the rights of the affected party”.82 
 
   The non-arbitrariness requirement 
 
  Introduction 
 
Before First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service,83 there was no certainty in as far as the approach that would be adopted with 
                                                          
76 [2010] ZACC 20; 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC); 2011 (2) BCLR 189 (CC) at para 39. 
77 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZACC 20; 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC); 
2011 (2) BCLR 189 (CC) at para 46. 
78 [2017] ZACC 26; 2017 (10) BCLR 1303 (CC); 2017 (6) SA 331 (CC). 
79 [2017] ZACC 31; 2017 (6) SA 287 (CC); 2017 (11) BCLR 1370 (CC). 
80 South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy NO and Others [2017] ZACC 
26; 2017 (10) BCLR 1303 (CC); 2017 (6) SA 331 (CC) at para 48. 
81 [2017] ZACC 31; 2017 (6) SA 287 (CC); 2017 (11) BCLR 1370 (CC). 
82 Jordaan and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2017] ZACC 31; 2017 (6) SA 287 (CC); 2017 
(11) BCLR 1370 (CC) at para 59. 
83 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
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regard to the interpretation of the non-arbitrariness requirement.84 In casu, the Constitutional 
Court interpreted “arbitrary” as when the “law” in question fails to provide a “sufficient reason” 
for the particular deprivation or when such deprivation is procedurally unfair.85 From this 
definition it is clear that there are two distinct tests which are used to determine whether a law 
that permits deprivation does so in an arbitrary manner or not. These tests are the substantive 
arbitrariness test and the procedural arbitrariness test.  
 
  The test for substantive arbitrariness 
 
In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service86 the Constitutional Court stated that when determining substantive arbitrariness, the key 
question is whether there is a sufficient reason for the deprivation of the property holder’s 
rights.87 In casu, the Court had to determine whether the provisions of a statute which permitted 
the deprivation of property belonging to an unrelated third party constituted arbitrary deprivation 
of property.88 Before it could answer this question, however, the Court had to set out and discuss 
the scope and ambit of the sufficient reason element.  
 
In this respect, the Constitutional Court held that the element is a flexible one and thus 
encompasses a wide range of tests.89 These tests range from a thin rationality test which is 
located at the low end of the spectrum, to a thicker test similar to the proportionality test which is 
located at the high end.90 In some cases, a simple rational connection between a legitimate 
government purpose and the manner in which the state seeks to achieve that purpose will 
                                                          
84 AJ van der Walt “An overview of developments in constitutional property law since the introduction of the 
property clause in 1993” (2004) 19 SAPR/PL at 67.  
85 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702  (CC) at para 100.  
86 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
87 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 100. 
88 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 46. 
89 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 100. 
90 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 62, 65 and 66. 
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constitute “sufficient reason”.91 In other cases, however, there must be a proportional 
relationship between a legitimate governmental purpose and the burden imposed by the state, 
which must be the least restrictive method.92  
 
An important difference between these tests is that while the rationality test imposes very few 
restrictions on the states’ power to interfere with private property,93 the proportionality test does 
impose more restrictions. It requires that the deprivation should not unfairly place a burden on 
the property holder where there are less “drastic or oppressive means to accomplish the desired 
end”.94  
 
When analysing the substance of a “law” to determine whether it satisfies the non-arbitrariness 
requirement, the court must use a “means-ends” test.95 In applying this test to the facts before it, 
the court must among other issues, evaluate the relationship between the means used and the end 
which the limitation seeks to achieve as well as the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the person.96 With regard to the level of scrutiny, as a general rule, a stricter test 
will be applicable where the property right in question is “ownership of land or a corporeal 
movable” as well as where the “deprivation affects all incidents of ownership”.97 
 
After setting out these principles, the Constitutional Court turned to apply them to the facts. 
Surprisingly, however, it hardly applied the means and ends test it formulated. Instead, the Court 
relied on the lack of a close connection between (a) the transaction giving rise to the debt and the 
property holder, (b) the customs debt and the property in question and (c) the property holder and 
                                                          
91 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 100. 
92First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 65 and 66. 
93 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 62. 
94 C Hoexter “Standards of review of administrative action: Review for reasonableness” in J Klaaren (ed) A delicate 
balance: The place of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy (2006) 61 at 64.  
95 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 100. 
96 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 100. 
97 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 100. 
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the debtor.98 Given that a close connection did not exist between these factors, the Court 
concluded, it could not be said that there was a “sufficient reason” for the deprivation.99 The 
deprivation, therefore, was arbitrary.100   
 
The substantive arbitrariness test has been hailed as a “positive development” that brings clarity 
with regard to the relevant considerations and does not overly limit the states’ police-power.101 
The flexibility of the test, however, has resulted in a lack clarity with regard to how future cases 
will be decided.102 Roux points out that although it appears like the test for substantive 
arbitrariness sets out a step-by-step process for the determination of arbitrariness, it does not do 
so.103 Instead, the Constitutional Court effectively “retained a wide discretion for the Court to 
decide cases on an individual basis rather than setting out guidelines for the prediction of 
outcomes”.104  Roux further criticizes the “means-ends” test because it bases the determination 
of the level of scrutiny on the type of property right and the extent of the deprivation, but it 
however fails to provide clarity with regard to why “certain property rights are more 
constitutionally valid than others”.105 It also fails to give clarity with regard to the considerations 
used to determine whether a deprivation is total or partial.106 
 
   The test for procedural arbitrariness 
                                                          
98 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 108 and 109.  
99 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 109. 
100 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 109. 
101 AJ van der Walt “An overview of developments in constitutional property law since the introduction of the 
property clause in 1993” (2004) 19 SAPR/PL at 68.  
102 In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZACC 5; 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) and Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality [2004] ZACC 9; 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC); the Constitutional Court was 
confronted with a deprivation caused by a law which movable and immovable property rights respectively, the 
Constitutional Court however reached different conclusions with regard to whether or not there was sufficient reason 
for the deprivations.  
103 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) at 274. 
104 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) at 274.  See also AJ van der Walt “An overview of developments in 
constitutional property law since the introduction of the property clause in 1993” (2004) 19 SAPR/PL at 68.  
105T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) at 274 
106 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman and M Bishop 




Although the Constitutional Court in First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service107 stated that the non-arbitrariness requirement 
also includes an evaluation of the procedural arbitrariness of the law, it did not go on to discuss 
and explain this aspect.108 This is understandable as the case was decided on the basis of 
substantive arbitrariness and not procedural arbitrariness.  
 
The test for procedural arbitrariness was subsequently set out in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality109 where the Constitutional Court stated that procedural arbitrariness 
is a flexible concept and that the requirements which must be satisfied to make a law 
procedurally fair will vary depending on all the circumstances of the specific case.110 The 
circumstances of this particular case were that the owner of immovable property was not 
permitted to alienate it until he or she had acquired a certificate from the municipality which 
showed that he or she had paid his or her consumption bills.111  
 
In casu, the Constitutional Court concluded that the procedural fairness requirement had not been 
met as the legislation failed to place an obligation on the municipality to provide the owner of 
the immovable property with the copies of the accounts upon request.112  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the test for procedural arbitrariness is restricted to those 
disputes in which a person has been deprived of his or her property by a law and not be an 
administrative decision. This is in order to ensure that the section 25 test for procedural 
arbitrariness does not overlap with the administrative justice test for procedural fairness. This 
restrictive approach was adopted by the Constitutional Court in its judgments in Reflect-All 1025 
CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
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and Another113 and Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd and Others.114 In both of these cases the Court held that it was not prepared to subject 
the deprivations in question to the section 25 test for procedural arbitrariness because the 
deprivations had been brought about as a result of an administrative decision and not as a result 
of a law.115 These cases have to be decided in terms of section 33 of the Constitution116 as well 
as the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 the “PAJA”.  
 
   The constitutional concept of an expropriation 
 
As alluded to above, state interference with a property holder’s rights, interests or objects is 
authorized by the property clause only where it constitutes either a valid deprivation or a valid 
expropriation.117 Although the Constitution itself does not define the constitutional concept of an 
expropriation or indicate how it should be distinguished from the constitutional concept of a 
deprivation, the Constitutional Court has considered these issues on several occasions. The 
leading judgments in this respect, however, are Harksen v Lane NO and Others;118 First 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service;119 and Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy.120  
 
In Harksen v Lane NO and Others,121 the Constitutional Court had to determine whether the 
provisions of section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 expropriated a solvent spouses’ 
property rights.122 In this case the Court treated deprivations and expropriations as two 
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114 [2010] ZACC 20; 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC); 2011 (2) BCLR 189 (CC). 
115 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
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categorically distinct concepts.123 It explained, in this respect, that even though expropriations 
are in essence a form of deprivation, the Interim Constitution’s property clause nevertheless drew 
a strict distinction between them.124 The main difference being that an expropriation requires the 
appropriation of property rights by the public authority, while a deprivation does not.125  
 
Apart from identifying the appropriation of property rights by a public authority as a 
distinguishing feature of an expropriation, the Constitutional Court also held that another key 
characteristic of an expropriation is that the appropriation must be permanent.126 Given that a 
solvent spouses’ property is not appropriated by a public authority and, given further, that the 
divestment of the solvent spouses’ property is temporary and not permanent, the Court held that 
section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act did not expropriate the solvent spouse’s property.127 Van der 
Walt, however, argues that the element of “permanence” on its own is not enough to distinguish 
between the concepts of a deprivation and an expropriation.128 He also submits that it is probable 
that the court actually had “the finality rather than the permanence of expropriation in mind, but 
that is not clear from the decision”.129  
 
Although the Constitutional Court drew a categorical distinction between deprivations and 
expropriation in Harksen v Lane NO and Others,130 it rejected this approach in First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service.131 In this 
case the Court held that deprivations and expropriations are not distinct concepts, instead, they 
lie on a continuum.132 The concept of a “deprivation”, therefore, is a wide one which 
encompasses all forms of interference, whereas the concept of an “expropriation” is a narrower 
one which encompasses only certain extreme forms of interference. The concept of an 
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expropriation, therefore, is a subset of the concept of a deprivations.133 In terms of this approach, 
a court will first ascertain whether there has been a deprivation of property and then go on to 
ascertain whether this deprivation also qualifies as an expropriation, instead of the applicant 
having to base their application on either of the constitutional concepts.134  
 
Although expropriations are now regarded as a subset of deprivations, it is still necessary to 
distinguish between these concepts.135 This is because a deprivation simply has to satisfy the 
requirements of section 25(1) in order to be valid, while an expropriation has to satisfy the 
requirements of both section 25(1) and section 25(2). In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service136 the Constitutional Court held 
that a deprivation may be distinguished from an expropriation on the ground that compensation 
has to be paid only for expropriations and not deprivations.137 Given that the payment of 
compensation is a requirement for a valid expropriation and not for a valid deprivation, this is 
not a particularly helpful ground on which to distinguish between the two concepts. 
 
An additional and more controversial ground for distinguishing between deprivations and 
expropriations was identified by the Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa v Minister for 
Minerals and Energy.138 In this case the Court had to decide whether the provisions of the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resource Development Act 28 of 2002 had expropriated the mineral 
rights held by Sebenza when it vested them in the state on behalf of the people of South 
Africa.139  
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Although the Court began its judgment by confirming the continuum approach adopted in First 
National Bank,140 it went on to find that the State must acquire the property right in question or 
something that is substantially similar to the property right in question before it can be said that 
an expropriation has taken place. After setting out these principles, the Court went on to find that 
the old order mineral rights in question had not been acquired by the State. This is because they 
had simply been extinguished and then replaced by new order mineral rights. Given this fact, it 
could not be said that they had been expropriated.141  
 
As Swanepoel has pointed out, the problem with this approach is that it is contradictory. 
Although the Court purported to follow the continuum approach it actually went on to 
categorically distinguish the two concepts by requiring that the State must acquire the property 
right before its actions can be classified as an expropriation.142 Requiring the element of an 
appropriation to be present for an interference to constitute an expropriation means that an 
expropriation cannot be regarded as being a subset of a deprivation.143 In casu, the Court appears 
to “simultaneously allow and not allow for a grey area” between these two concepts.144 
 
As can be seen, the First National Bank approach appears to have changed the approach in 
Harksen v Lane145 which regarded the concepts of a deprivation and an expropriation as being 
two distinct concepts. The continuum approach formulated in First National Bank case requires 
the courts to always ascertain whether there the interference with property rights is in line with 
the requirements for a valid deprivation first before moving on to ascertain whether the 
deprivation in question also constitutes an expropriation.146 In terms of this approach, the court 
will also look into the question of whether a deprivation qualifies as an expropriation even where 
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the issue has not been raised before the court.147 The approach taken by the Constitutional Court 
Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 148 brought even more confusion as the 
Court in casu stated that it confirms the continuum approach but went on to follow the Harksen v 
Lane149 approach which categorically distinguishes between the two concepts.150 Consequently, 
it is unclear how the courts will interpret or distinguish between these concepts in future cases. 
 
   The public purpose or public interest requirement 
 
In terms of section 25(2)(a) of the Constitution, an expropriation of property will only be 
constitutionally valid when it is carried out for the furtherance of a public purpose or public 
interest.151 After finding that there was an expropriation, a court must then go on to determine 
whether the expropriation satisfies the public purpose/public interest requirement.  
 
The public purpose or public interest requirement has two main functions which are (a) to limit 
the expropriatory powers of the State and (b) to authorize the reformative agenda of the property 
clause.152 It seeks to ensure that the State does not abuse its power by expropriating individuals’ 
property rights and interests without there being a public benefit which necessitates the 
expropriation in question.153 The Constitution in defining this requirement only states that it 
includes the “nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access 
to all South Africa’s natural resources”.154 It does not give a further explanation of what 
constitutes public purpose/public interest.  
 
There are various ways in which the public purpose/public interest requirement can be         
interpreted. In a wide sense, it could be interpreted as referring to “all purposes which pertain to 
or benefit the general public”, or in a narrow sense, it could refer to governmental purposes 
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only.155 It has been suggested that the best way to interpret this requirement is to find a balance 
between a strict interpretation which ensures that “the power of expropriation is not abused” and 
a lenient interpretation which will allow the State to expropriate land from private property 
holders for public benefit, in line with the reformative agenda.156 Such an interpretation reflects 
the double purpose of the property clause which is to both protect individual property rights and 
to promote the transformative agenda. 
 
The role played by public purpose/public interest requirement for valid expropriations seems to 
have been downplayed by the First National Bank approach to the resolution of property 
disputes.157 This approach requires that every interference with a property holder’s rights be first 
tested against the requirements for a valid deprivation before going on to look into the 
requirements for a valid expropriation.158 As a result of this approach, it is unlikely that a law 
which does not seek to further a public purpose or public interest will be regarded as providing 
“sufficient reason” for the deprivation of the property holder’s rights.159 Once a law which 
provides for the expropriation has passed the test for a valid deprivation, it is very likely that it 
will easily satisfy the public purpose/public interest requirement in section 25(2)(a).160  
 
Van der Walt points out that in spite of this, the public purpose requirement is likely to come up 
in the following cases: 
(a)  where the State transfers the property to a private individual or institute, 
(b)  where the State has abandoned the original public purpose, and 
(c)  where there are other less intrusive ways of achieving the purpose or where the State 
takes more than what is necessary to achieve the particular purpose.161 
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An example of one such case is Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality.162 In this case the KwaZulu-
Natal High Court had to decide whether where the State abandoned the original purpose for the 
deprivation, the original property holder has the right to reclaim the property.163 The applicant 
argued that once the initial public purpose can no longer be realized, the expropriation was no 
longer constitutional.164 The KwaZulu-Natal High Court however refused to accept this 
argument; it was of the view that where the state has acted in good faith, then the expropriation is 
still constitutional.165 Van der Walt argues that the High Court in casu did not give proper regard 
to the role played by the public purpose requirement in cases where the public authority fails or 
can no longer carry out the original authority.166  
 
Although section 25(1), which deals with the broader concept of a deprivation, does not 
expressly mention the public purpose or public interest requirement, it is, however argued that it 
is an implicit requirement for a valid deprivation.167 The reasoning behind this argument is that 
the public law regulation of property inherently seeks to promote public good and this is 
evidenced by the police-power principle which is an integral part of the constitutional concept of 
property.168 Thus, it is only logical that even where non-expropriatory deprivations are 
concerned, the regulatory provisions should in addition to the requirement of non-arbitrariness 
also satisfy the requirement for the furtherance of a public purpose or public interest.169 
 
   Conclusion 
 
The decision in the First National Bank case has been praised for having brought clarity with 
regard to the interpretation of property rights. The Constitutional Court in casu made strides as it 
not only outlined the series of questions for the resolution of disputes but also brought much 
needed clarity with regard to the interpretation of the non-arbitrariness test. Prior to the finding in 
                                                          
162 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
163 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) at para 1. 
164 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) at para 80. 
165 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) at para 138 and 150. 
166 AJ van der Walt and BV Slade “Public purpose and changing circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
and Others” (2012) 129 SALJ at 220. 
167 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 2ed (2005) at 140. 
168 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 2ed (2005) at 140. 
169 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2013) at 33. 
38 
 
First National Bank, it was not clear whether the “arbitrary deprivation” requirement would 
allow courts to examine the substance of the law. The ‘means-ends’ test which is used to test the 
non-arbitrariness of the substance of a law is a welcome development as it is a flexible test which 
enables the court to consider contextual issues and decide cases on a case by case basis. This is 
essential for the realization of the constitutional goal of reforming the unfair racial division in as 
far as the ownership of property is concerned. 
 
The flexibility of the First National Bank’s approach, which is the very characteristic that allows 
the clause to be interpreted purposively, however, results in the creation of an “arbitrary 
deprivation vortex”. The non-arbitrariness test appears to assume an overarching role in the 
resolution of property disputes. Other questions which must be dealt with at a later stage such as 
the public interest/public purpose requirement for a valid expropriation have been sucked into 
the “arbitrary deprivation vortex”;  this is because the “means-ends” test also includes an 
examination of the relationship between the interference and the purpose it seeks to achieve. It 
has to be accepted, however, that only a flexible test can give the courts space to interpret the 















CHAPTER THREE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CONCEPT 
PRIOR TO SHOPRITE-CHECKERS 
 
   Introduction 
 
The issue of what constitutes “property” for the purposes of section 25 is very important in the 
resolution of disputes based on the property clause. This is because it plays a gatekeeping role. A 
person has to first show that the object, right or interest in question falls within the scope and 
ambit of the constitutional concept of property before he or she can successfully rely on the 
property clauses’ protection.170 The issue of “property”, therefore, is not only a threshold 
question, but also a point at which a court can resolve a dispute based on the property clause.171 
Consequently, if a court should find that the object, right or interest does not fall within the scope 
and ambit of the constitutional concept of property that will be the end of the road, it cannot go 
on to look into whether there was an arbitrary deprivation or an unlawful expropriation of the 
“property” in question.  
 
Clarity with regard to the objects, rights and interests that qualify for constitutional protection 
and especially clarity with regard to how the courts will determine whether a particular object, 
right or interest qualifies for constitutional protection, therefore, is very important. This clarity, 
however, cannot be obtained from the text of the Constitution’s as it does not offer much help in 
this regard.  The text of the Constitution merely stipulates that that the constitutional concept of 
property includes the ownership of land, but is not restricted to land ownership. It neither defines 
nor gives express guidelines for the interpretation of the meaning of “property” in a 
constitutional sense. This question, therefore, has been left to be answered by the legislature and 
the judiciary.  
 
Given that it is a constitutional right, the interpretation of the concept of constitutional property 
has to be guided by the principles which govern the interpretation of the Constitution as a whole. 
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In this respect it is important to note that the manner in which the Constitution must be 
interpreted is different from the manner in which an ordinary statute must be interpreted.172 This 
is because, unlike an ordinary statute, the Constitution was drafted “in a broad and ample 
style”.173 This “broad and ample” approach to drafting the Constitution was aimed at ensuring 
that its provisions can adapt to change and thus remain relevant.174 In order to achieve this goal, 
the provisions of the Constitution, therefore, should be interpreted in a generous manner.175  
 
Apart from interpreting the provisions of the Constitution in a generous manner, they should also 
be interpreted in a purposive manner with “reference to the values underlying an ‘open and 
democratic society based in human dignity, equality and freedom’”, even where the literal 
meaning is clear.176 This is because the process of constitutional interpretation is essentially 
aimed at “determining the way in which a commitment to a set of fundamental values translates 
and applies in a specific context”.177 The key role that the values underlying the Constitution 
play in the process of constitutional interpretation is highlighted by various provisions of the 
Constitution. One of the most significant of these is section 39(1)(a) which provides that “[w]hen 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must [own emphasis] promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.178  
 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to set out and discuss the manner in which the constitutional 
concept of property was interpreted and applied by courts, and especially the Constitutional 
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Court, prior to its judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape.179 
 
   The distinction between constitutional property and private law property 
 
Before setting out and discussing the manner in which the constitutional concept of property has 
been interpreted and applied by the courts, it will be helpful to briefly discuss the differences 
between the private law and the constitutional concepts of property. This is because the existing 
private law concept often plays an important role in determining the scope and ambit of the 
constitutional concept.180  
 
At the heart of the private law concept of property is the notion of a “thing”. A thing is defined in 
modern South African law as a corporeal object which is external to human beings, independent 
and subject to juridical control. In addition, it must also be useful and valuable to humans.181 
Any object which satisfies these criteria may be defined as a thing. As this definition indicates, 
the notion of a thing is a narrow one which focuses on the intrinsic quality of these objects.182 
The origins of this focus may be traced back to Roman and Roman-Dutch law.183 
  
In spite of its focus on things, the private law concept of property is not confined to corporeal 
objects only; there are exceptions. These exceptions consist of the (incorporeal) real rights a 
person may acquire in respect of a thing. Real rights are divided into two categories, namely 
ownership and limited real rights. Ownership is the only real right which a person may acquire in 
his or her own property. In principle, it confers unlimited powers on an owner.184 Limited real 
rights are real rights a person may acquire in someone else’s property. As their name indicates, 
they confer a limited number of powers on their holders.185  
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Although the inclusion of these real rights in the private law concept of property indicates that 
the concept is not confined to corporeal objects, it is important to note that real rights are closely 
linked to things. This is because they confer direct powers over the thing itself on their holders 
and thus establish a direct relationship between the holder of the right and the thing. Other 
categories of private law rights which do not confer direct powers over the thing itself on their 
holders, such as personal rights, intellectual property rights and personality rights, therefore, do 
not fall into the private law concept of property.186  
 
While the private law concept of property often plays an important role in determining the 
constitutional concept of property, it must be kept in mind that the constitutional concept is 
distinct and separate from the private law concept. This is mainly because it arises from public 
law. Unlike private law, which governs the relationship between individuals, public law governs 
the creation, organisation, powers and procedures of the state.187 It therefore concerns itself with 
the national agenda and not just relationships between individuals. As such, the protection 
afforded to property holders by the constitution’s property clause differs quite significantly from 
the protection afforded by the private law.188  
 
Private law property accordingly concerns itself with issues such as the “acquisition, protection 
and transfer of private property” and protects these individual rights against any interference 
which may affect them.189 Constitutional property, however, is a “social construct, subject to 
regulation and amendment in the public interest”.190 The protection of “property” under the 
property clause, therefore, is aimed not only at protecting the individual’s existing property 
rights, but also at promoting the public good, including the transformation of South Africa 
                                                          
186 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) at 114. 
187 AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7ed 2016 at 337. 
188 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) at 141; Van der Walt points out that this approach taken by 
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Mostert and PJ Badenhorst “Property and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (2014) at 3FB6.2.2 
190 H Mostert and PJ Badenhorst “Property and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (2014) at 3FB6.2.2. 
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system of land rights.191 It follows, therefore, that what is deemed “property” under the property 
clause “can be changed, restricted, and subjected to new or stricter regulatory controls, 
limitations and levies” even without compensation being paid to the property holder.192 
 
In light of the differences between the private law concept of property and the constitutional 
concept of property, Van der Walt argues that: 
 
“the Constitution seems to require a wide notion of property in the sense that a too narrow understanding of property 
might stand in the way of the reform goal of opening up access to property. If property is defined narrowly for 
purposes of the section 25, it is at least possible that vested and acquired (mostly white) rights in land would be 
entrenched, while black interests in land and other property, which remained weak and underdeveloped under 
apartheid land law and were often not recognized as property in private law, would quite possibly continue to be 
excluded from both private and constitutional recognition and protection. Furthermore, it might be difficult to 
include the “new order” rights of access to land, housing and natural resources and the right to tenure security, all of 
which have been introduced by or in view of the Constitution, under a narrow notion of constitutional property. 
Such a restrictive reading looks unacceptable in view of constitutional objectives and therefore it is necessary to 
develop a relatively wide notion of constitutional property, which would allow the introduction of “new order” 
constitutional access rights under the property guarantee.”193 
 
   The constitutional concept of property 
 
   Introduction 
 
Prior to the judgment in Shoprite Checkers, the Constitutional Court in most of its decisions did 
not devote a lot of attention to the manner in which the constitutional concept of property should 
be interpreted. Instead, it simply dealt with this issue on a case by case basis and often simply 
assumed that the object, right or interest in question fell into the constitutional definition of 
property.  
 
                                                          
191 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 107 where Van der Walt explains that this function 
of the constitution is “difficult to reconcile with the libertan absolute entrenchment of existing property holdings.” 
192 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 101. 
193 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) at 123. 
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Despite the fact that it did not devote a lot of attention to the manner in which the constitutional 
concept should be interpreted, it did identify a wide range of objects, rights and interests as 
constitutional property. Among these were corporeal movables and immovable, ownership, 
limited real rights, entitlements, intellectual property rights and personal rights. These objects, 
rights and interests will be discussed in this segment. 
 
   Ownership 
 
In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
the Constitutional Court confirmed that the ownership of corporeal movable and immovable 
things falls into the constitutional concept of property.194 The facts of this case were as follows. 
Three motor vehicles owned by First National Bank were seized and detained in terms of the 
provisions of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1961.195 This provision conferred 
on the Commissioner of the SARS the power to seize and sell goods in the possession of a 
customs debtor, even if they belonged to an innocent third party, for the purposes of collecting a 
debt owed to the South African Revenue Authority.196  
 
First National Bank argued that section 114 unjustifiably infringed section 25 of the Constitution 
because it expropriated the Bank’s property without paying just and equitable compensation. The 
Constitutional Court found that section 114 was unconstitutional, not because it expropriated 
First National Bank’s property without paying just and equitable compensation and thus 
infringed section 25(2), but rather because it arbitrarily deprived First National Bank of its 
property and thus infringed section 25(1). In arriving at this decision, one of the issues the Court 
had to determine was whether the ownership of a movable corporeal thing fell into the 
constitutional concept of property. The Court held that it did. 
 
In this respect, the Constitutional Court began by warning that it was not only “practically 
impossible”, but also “judicially unwise” to attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of the 
                                                          
194 [2002] ZACC 5; 2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
195 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR (CC) at para 2. 
196 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR (CC) at para 4. 
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constitutional concept of property.197 The Court, therefore, left the issue of “property” to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Insofar as the ownership of corporeal movable and immovable 
things was concerned, however, the Court held that: 
 
“[the] ownership of a corporeal movable must – as must ownership of land – lie at the heart of our constitutional 
concept of property, both as regards the nature of the right as well as the object of the right and must therefore, in 
principle enjoy the protection of section 25.”198  
 
Apart from deciding whether the ownership of corporeal movable and immovable things falls 
into the constitutional concept of property, the Constitutional Court also had to decide whether 
ownership does so when it is employed simply as a contractual device to secure payment of a 
debt. The Commissioner of the SARS argued in this respect that First National Bank had sold the 
three vehicles in terms of a credit agreement and that t retained ownership simply as a 
contractual device to secure the payment of the purchase price. It never intended to use the 
vehicles.199  
 
The Constitutional Court, however, refused to accept this argument.200 Instead, it stated that the 
determination of what constitutes constitutional property is not dependent on the subjective 
commercial interest that the owner has in the particular object and neither is it dependent on the 
economic value of the right (considering that the value of the ownership right would gradually 
go down as the contract came to an end).201 Furthermore, the fact that the property holder does 
not make any use or makes limited use of the object is irrelevant in answering the threshold 
                                                          
197 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702  (CC) at para 47 and 51. The effect of this judgment is that it set 
precedence for the determination of the bounds of constitutional property on a case by case basis. 
198 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 51. 
199 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, Southern African Revenue Service  [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 53. 
200 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, Southern African Revenue Service  [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 54. 
201 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, Southern African Revenue Service  [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 56. 
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question.202 The Court pointed out that this may, however, be relevant at a later stage when the 
Court determines whether the deprivation was carried out in an arbitrary manner.   
 
Besides outlining the relevant and irrelevant considerations, the Constitutional Court did not 
however go on to give a practical demonstrate of how the courts would apply all the relevant 
considerations to reach a decision on whether an object, right or interest is constitutionally 
protected property. It did, however, explain that these considerations are issues that would need 
to be considered in the difficult cases and not in this case.203 Implying that the inclusion of the 
ownership right in corporeal movables and land is an easy case. Moreover, the conclusion 
reached by the Constitutional Court, is in line with the views expressed by legal commentators; 
that the constitutional concept of property cannot be narrower than its private law counterpart.204 
 
   Limited real rights 
 
Although the Constitutional Court referred only to the right of ownership in corporeal movable 
and immovable things in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service, after this judgment it was generally accepted by academic and other 
commentators that limited real rights should also be included in the constitutional concept of 
property. This belief was subsequently confirmed by the Western Cape High Court in Ex parte 
Optimal Property Solutions CC.205 In this case, the High Court simply held that because the 
restrictive condition in question had “the character” of a registered praedial servitude it should be 
protected under the property clause.206 As Van der Walt argued, this decision appears to endorse 
                                                          
202 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, Southern African Revenue Service  [2002] ZACC 5; 
2002(4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) at para 54. 
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see also T Roux and D Davis “Property” in H Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill Of Rights 
(2015) at 16. 
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the inclusion of all forms of servitudes207 and in successive cases the courts have gone on to find 
that personal servitudes208 as well as public servitude209 are constitutionally protected property. 
 
Insofar as mineral rights are concerned, the Transvaal High Court initially held in Lebowa 
Mineral Trust Beneficiaries Forum v Government of the Republic of South210 that they do not 
qualify for constitutional protection under the property clause. If the drafters of the Constitution 
had been intended that the constitutional concept of property should encompass mineral rights, 
the High Court reasoned, then these rights would have been expressly referred to in the property 
clause. The fact that they were not, indicated that mineral rights did not fall into the 
constitutional concept of property.211 As Pienaar and Van der Walt have pointed out, however, 
requiring that an object, right or interest should be expressly mentioned in the property clause 
before it can qualify for constitutional protection is problematic. This decision, therefore, has 
been criticized for adopting an “unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of section 25”. 212  
 
In a more recent judgment, Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy213 the 
Constitutional Court changed the position and found that mineral rights established under the 
Minerals Act 50 of 1991 are indeed “property” protected by section 25.214 In casu, the 
Constitutional Court had to determine whether the minerals rights which Sebenza had under the 
Minerals Act had been taken away under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act 28 of 2002.215 In arriving at this conclusion, the Constitutional Court examined the nature of 
the mineral rights as protected in the Minerals Act. It noted that mineral rights protected under 
                                                          
207 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 139-140. 
208 National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 (2) SA 157 (SCA); [2011] 3 All 
SA 29 (SCA) [2010] ZASCA 164 at para 33 where the Constitutional Court concluded that the naming right that had 
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the Minerals Act were similar to the common law position that a landowner had the right to 
exploit the minerals on their land.216 The mineral rights could be alienated by cession, that they 
could be leased to others, that they were treated as an asset with economic value and that they 
could be bequeathed to another.217 This meant that the owner of mineral rights could decide 
whether or not to exploit the minerals. The State could only interfere with this right only upon 
the payment of compensation. On this basis, the Constitutional Court found that the mineral 
rights held by Sebenza under the Minerals Act were indeed constitutional property.218  
 
  Land-use-related entitlements 
 
One of the advantages that is usually associated with ownership and limited real rights is that 
they confer entitlements over the movable or immovable thing in question on their holders. 
These entitlements, which differ from real right to real right, include inter alia the entitlement to 
possess, to use and enjoy, to burden, to alienate, to destroy and to vindicate the thing in question. 
The entitlement to alienate was recognized as constitutional property by the Constitutional Court 
in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another.219 In this case, the 
Court found that there had been a “deprivation of a single but important incident of ownership in 
immovable property namely the right to pass transfer of property to complete alienation.”220 
Since then the courts have recognised various land-use-related entitlements as constituting 
constitutional property.221 These include the entitlement to use and enjoy land, which also 
                                                          
216 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy [2013] ZACC 9; 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2013 (7) BCLR 727 
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217 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy [2013] ZACC 9; 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2013 (7) BCLR 727 
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219 [2004] ZACC 9; 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) at para 33.  
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National Bank approach of looking into the separate “incidents of ownership” that have been interfered with are 
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included the right to extract gravel from it,222 and the entitlement not to be arbitrarily evicted 
from land.223 
 
   Intellectual property rights 
 
Apart from ownership and limited real rights, the Constitutional Court has also held that 
intellectual property rights fall into the constitutional concept of property.  
 
Insofar as these rights are concerned, the Constitutional Court initially adopted a cautious 
approach. In the First Certification case224 it was argued that the failure to expressly refer to 
intellectual property rights in section 25 of the Constitution meant that these rights would not be 
protected by the property clause.225 Although the Court rejected this argument on the grounds 
that that the mere failure to expressly refer to intellectual property rights in section 25 did not 
means that they fell outside the scope and ambit of the property clause,226 it refused to rule 
conclusively on the issue of whether or not intellectual property rights qualify for constitutional 
protection under the property clause. 
 
Despite this initial caution, the Constitutional Court subsequently confirmed in Laugh It Off 
Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of 
Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae)227 that intellectual property rights do fall into the scope 
                                                          
222 Du Toit v Minister of Transport [2005] ZACC 9; 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC); 2005 (11) BCLR 1053 (CC) at para 54. 
223 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217; 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) 
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(prohibition against arbitrary eviction in section 26(3) and right of access to courts in section 34) and land reform 
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South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) 1996; (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 75. 
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and ambit of the constitutional concept of property. In this case the Court accepted that a 
registered trademark was property for the purposes of section 25, although without addressing 
this issue in any detail and without providing a legal basis for doing so.228 After coming to this 
conclusion, it went on to balance SAB’s trademark against Laugh it Off’s right to freedom of 
speech.229  
 
Apart from a registered trade mark, the Constitutional Court also held in Phumelela Gaming and 
Leisure Ltd v Grundlingh that information (published results and dividends derived from 
Phumelela’s totalisator pool) could be protected as either intellectual property or goodwill230 and 
in National Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd231 the South Gauteng High Court held that 
intellectual property rights in the form of copyrights also fall into the scope and ambit of the 
constitutional concept of property.232 
 
It has been suggested that in the case of intellectual property rights, the following characteristics 
could also have been used to justify the inclusion of intellectual property; 
(a)  inherent or accrued economic value for holder, 
(b)  labour and resources were invested in the creation of the interest,  
(c)  interest has vested, 
(d)  there is no other constitutional clause that could possibly provide protection to the 
specific category of property interests.233 
 
   Personal rights 
 
Although personal rights are not considered to be property rights from a private law perspective 
primarily because they arise from delict and contract and, consequently, can be enforced only 
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against a specific person or group of persons,234 the Constitutional Court has not hesitated to 
include them in the definition of constitutional property. In Law Society of South Africa and 
Others v Minister of Transport,235 for example, the Court assumed without deciding that 
personal rights in the form of claims for loss of earning capacity and loss of support are 
constitutionally protected property rights.236 In arriving at this decision, the Court stated that it 
was “unnecessary to resolve the debate” even though it was dealing with interests which did not 
only fail to fit neatly within the private law concept of property but could only be enforced 
against specific person(s).237 
 
Since then other forms of personal rights have also been accepted as falling within the scope and 
ambit of constitutional concept of property. In National Credit Regulator v Oppermann and 
Others,238 the Constitutional Court held that a claim based on unjustified enrichment qualifies for 
constitutional protection239 and in National Credit Regulator v Oppermann and Others240 it held 
that it was “logical and realistic”241 to include a personal right in the form of a “right for 
restitution of money paid, based on unjustified enrichment” in the constitutional concept of 
property. Most recently, in Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Transport242 the Court held 
that a personal right in the form of a claim for a received payment also constitutes constitutional 
property.243 In this case Court justified its extension of the property clauses’ ambit on the basis 
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that unlike the personal right in the Oppermann case, this was much more easily acceptable as it 
was a payment that had actually been received by the other party.244 
 
   Housing and other welfare rights 
 
One of the most difficult issues the constitutional concept of property gives rise to is whether 
public law entitlements should be included. These entitlements fall into various categories which 
include social welfare rights, employment rights, and commercial and other licences.  
 
As early as 1996, in Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic of South 
Africa,245 though obiter, the Transkei High Court expressed the view that the constitutional 
notion of property could be so wide as to include a housing subsidy which a welfare right.246 In 
another case, Ex Parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal In re Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa 
Amendment Bill of 1995247 the court also appears to have regarded “certain conditions of service 
relating to payment” as constitutional property as the court found that they were not contrary to 
section 28 of the Interim Constitution.248  
 
The inclusion of housing rights within the notion of constitutional property was confirmed in  
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers249 where the Constitutional Court stated that 
“the Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to property 
not previously recognised by the common law. It counter poses to the normal ownership rights of 
possession, use and occupation a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived of 
a home.”250 
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Central to the Courts’ reasoning was the consideration of the constitutional value of dignity, the 
need for redress and secure land tenure for the poor as well as the interrelatedness of the property 
clause and the section 26 goal of providing adequate housing.251 In its judgment, the 
Constitutional Court stated that: 
 
“The Constitution recognises that land rights and the right of access to housing and of not being arbitrarily evicted, 
are closely intertwined. The stronger the right to land, the greater the prospect of a secure home. Thus, the need to 
strengthen the precarious position of people living in informal settlements is recognised by section 25 in a number of 
ways. Land reform is facilitated, and the state is required to foster conditions enabling citizens to gain access to land 
on an equitable basis; persons or communities with legally insecure tenure because of discriminatory laws are 
entitled to secure tenure or other redress; and persons dispossessed of property by racially discriminatory laws are 
entitled to restitution or other redress. Furthermore, sections 25 and 26 create a broad overlap between land rights 
and socio-economic rights, emphasising the duty on the state to seek to satisfy both, as this Court said in 
Grootboom.”252 
 
Van der Walt and Viljoen in discussing the right to housing submit that in foreign jurisdictions, 
housing rights of non-owners are only protected as constitutional rights if they are not 
specifically protected under the Constitution’s property clause.253 They further argue that the 
protection of these rights under the property clause will not be necessary as they are already 
protected under section 26 of the Constitution.254 Besides the fact that the housing rights are 
already constitutional protected, Van der Walt and Viljoen also argue that the inclusion of 
housing rights within the constitutional notion of property “might well reduce or even erode the 
special social, historical and constitutional value and meaning of housing rights.”255  
 
The opposition to the inclusion of public law entitlements, however, seems to be mainly directed 
to welfare rights. With respect to welfare rights it is has also been argued that there is no need for 
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such rights to be protected under the property clause as they are already protected 
constitutionally.256 Legal commentators have conceded that there may, however, be a need to 
protect commercial interests (licenses, permits and quotas) as well as pension claims under the 
property clause.257 These interests are quite important in the modern world of commerce. Van 
der Walt points out that they are important because “these interests can acquire great value, 
especially when they give access to services, trading or manufacturing opportunities and when 
they can be sold and transferred.”258  
 
With the exception of housing rights, the inclusion of these public law entitlements was 
considered for the first time by the Constitutional Court in the Shoprite Checkers case this case 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
   Conclusion 
 
The Constitutional Court in First National Bank made it clear that the public law approach to 
determining whether a particular o differs significantly from the approach taken in private law. 
The Court stated that the constitutional notion of property cannot be derived from applying 
private law principles of determining “property”. The private law notion is however not devoid 
of influence in as far as the constitutional concept of property is concerned. As per the finding in 
First National Bank, the rights and objects that it protects form the foundation of constitutional 
property. These being the ownership rights and real rights. “Property” in the constitutional law 
sense is, however a much wider concept than its private law counterpart. As such the protection 
afforded by the constitutional notion of property extends to various forms of intangible property 
which include, land-use-related rights, intellectual property rights, personal rights and even 
public law entitlements. 
 
Constitutional property is not derived from an interpretation of section 25 only; but from a 
purposive interpretation of the property clause that takes into account the provisions of the entire 
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Constitution, contextual issues as well as the tension between the interests of the individual and 
the public interest. As such, the emphasis is on the various objectives which the constitutional 
protection of property seeks to achieve. These objectives include the transformation of the 
racially unequal distribution of property and the creation of a society that is based on the 
constitutional values of “human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
 
When deciding on the objects and interests which constitute the constitutional notion of property, 
the Constitutional Court has unfortunately often failed to give a practical demonstration of how 
these considerations are to be used to determine the property issue. This trend began with First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service259 where 
the court dealt with a right that was already deemed “property” under private law. This trend has, 
however, been followed in subsequent cases, even where the cases did not concern forms of 
property that are not traditionally regarded as “property”. The Port Elizabeth Municipality is one 
of the very few cases in which the courts have applied the principles to the facts at hand. In this 
case, the Constitutional Court in applying the purposive approach took into account the “rights 
based vision of the Constitution.” It was therefore of the view that the right to dignity as well as 
the right to housing which is closely linked with the right to property justified the inclusion of 
the land-use-related right – not to be arbitrarily evicted from land that one does not own. The 
omission in as far as the justification for the inclusion of certain objects rights or interests within 
the constitutional notion of property creates a problem of lack of clarity as to how courts will 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CONCEPT IN 
SHOPRITE CHECKERS  
 
       Introduction 
 
As we have already seen, prior to its judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape,260 the Constitutional 
Court approached the constitutional concept of property on a case-by-case basis. Employing this 
approach, the Court extended the constitutional concept of property far beyond the private law 
concept of a real right in a thing. It found in this respect that not only real rights and things, but 
also intellectual property rights and personal rights fell within the constitutional definition of 
“property”.261 Apart from the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of a home derived from section 
26 of the Constitution, however, it did not extend this concept beyond the field of private law 
rights and objects. In addition, it did fully engage with the constitutional concept of property 
from a theoretical perspective.  
 
All of this changed in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape.262 In this case the Constitutional Court, not 
only extended the constitutional concept of property to include a public law entitlement in the 
form of a “grocer’s wine licence” (although by a bare majority of six out eleven judges), but also 
fully engaged with the constitutional concept of property from at least two different theoretical 
perspectives, namely a “values-based approach” and an “attributes-based approach”. The values-
based approach was adopted by Froneman J (Cameron, Jappie and Nkabinda JJ concurring) in 
his main judgment. Using this approach he came to the conclusion that a grocer’s wine licence is 
constitutional property. The attributes approach was adopted by Madllanga J (Tshiqi J 
concurring) in his concurring judgment. Using this approach he came to the same conclusion.  
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In his minority judgment, Moseneke DCJ (Mogoeng CJ, Khampepe J, Moemela and Theron AJ 
concurring) held that it was not necessary for the Constitutional Court to decide whether a 
grocer’s wine licence could be defined as constitutional property. This is because the matter 
could be resolved by applying the test for rationality which is an aspect of the principle of 
legality, rather than the test for sufficient reason which is an aspect of the requirement of non-
arbitrariness in section 25(1) of the Constitution. Despite coming to this conclusion, Moseneke 
DCJ, nevertheless, went on to consider whether a grocer’s wine licence could be defined as 
constitutional property. He found that it could not. 
  
Each of these judgments will be discussed in turn. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to 
set out the facts and to identify the issues that arose for decision in this case. 
 
     The facts 
 
In 2003, the Eastern Cape Legislature passed the Eastern Cape Liquor Act 10 of 2003 (the 
“ECLA”) which, as its name indicates, regulates the sale of alcohol in the province. Before the 
ECLA was passed, the sale of alcohol was regulated by the Liquor Act 27 of 1989. In terms of 
this Act, Shoprite Checkers held a “grocer’s wine license”, which allowed it to sell alcohol 
alongside food in its supermarkets in the Eastern Cape. The ECLA repealed the Liquor Act and 
abolished this license. Instead of a grocer’s wine license, the ECLA provided that Shoprite 
Checkers could apply for an “all-kinds license”. This license allowed a license-holder to sell any 
kind of alcohol, but only in a separate dedicated bottle store and not in a supermarket. 
 
The transitional provisions of the ECLA gave existing licence holders 10 years within which to 
apply for an all-kinds licence. Shoprite Checkers, however, chose not to do so and at the end of 
the 10 year period its grocer’s wine licence lapsed. Shoprite Checkers then applied to the Eastern 
Cape High Court in Mthatha for an order declaring the ECLA to be unconstitutional and invalid 
on the grounds that it arbitrarily deprived Shoprite Checkers of its property contrary to the 
provisions of section 25(1) when it abolished the grocer’s wine license. The High Court agreed 
with Shoprite Checkers and declared the relevant parts of the ECLA to be unconstitutional and 
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invalid. It then referred its judgment to the Constitutional Court for confirmation in terms of 
section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
 
A plurality of the Constitutional Court refused to confirm the High Court’s judgment. Instead, 
the plurality found that while Shoprite Checkers’ grocer’s wine license could be classified as 
“property”, Shoprite had not been arbitrarily deprived of its license by the ECLA and that the 
ECLA, therefore, was constitutionally valid. In arriving at this decision, the Court had to 
consider two key issues: first, whether Shoprite Checkers’ grocer’s wine license was “property” 
in terms of section 25(1); and, if it was, second, whether Shoprite Checkers had been arbitrarily 
deprived of its property.  
 
Insofar as the first question was concerned, the Constitutional Court split three ways. As pointed 
out above, two of the judgments (per Froneman J (the main judgment) and Madlanga J (the 
concurring judgment on this issue)) found that the grocer’s wine license was property, although 
for different reasons, while the third judgment (per Moseneke DCJ (the minority judgment on 
this issue)) found that it was not. Insofar as the second question was concerned, the Court also 
split three ways. Two of the judgments (per Froneman J (the main judgment) and Moseneke DCJ 
(the concurring judgment on this issue)) found that Shoprite Checkers had not been arbitrarily 
deprived of its property, while the third judgment (per Madlanga J (the minority judgment on this 
issue)) found that it had. 
 
     Froneman J 
 
As we have already seen, Froneman J found that Shoprite Checkers’ grocer’s wine license was 
property for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution.263 In arriving at this conclusion, 
Froneman J, began by setting out the contextual issues which a court must bear in mind when 
interpreting constitutional concept of “property”.  
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He pointed out in this respect that South Africa’s context is one in which the constitutional 
protection of property is “regarded with suspicion from different perspectives”.264 This is 
because the history of property in South Africa is a “history of dispossession of what indigenous 
people held, and its transfer to the colonisers in the form of land and other property”. This 
history of dispossession “has resulted in opposing ideological views on the place of property 
within the constitutional system.  
 
On the one side is the “view that ‘property is theft’”. On the other side is the “view that the 
protection of property lies not only at the heart of atomised individual personal autonomy but 
also a truly efficient free market economic system”. In between these extreme views, “lie the 
contrasting fears that giving too much protection to private property will inhibit the State’s role 
to effect the transformation that the Constitution requires, as against the view that not giving 
enough protection will also undermine transformation by inhibiting economic development”.265 
  
Given these contested views, Froneman J pointed out further, it was necessary to formulate a 
uniquely South African approach to the interpretation of the constitutional concept of 
property.266 This unique approach had to be rooted “within the normative framework of the 
fundamental values and individual rights in the Constitution.”267 It could not be based on private 
law conceptions of property. This is because such an approach would (a) exclude public law 
objects, rights and interests from the protection provided by section 25 and (b) result in an 
unintentional failure to subject private law notions of property to section 25 scrutiny.268  
 
Apart from the fact that the constitutional concept of property should not be based on private law 
conceptions of property, Froneman J went on to point out, the constitutional concept of property 
has to be defined in a manner that promotes the fundamental values that underlie the Constitution 
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and especially human dignity, equality and freedom.269 These values demand a constitutional 
concept of property that “allows, on the one hand, for individual self-fulfilment in the holding of 
property, and, on the other, the recognition that the holding property also carries with it a social 
obligation not to harm the public good. The function that the protection of holding property must 
thus, broadly, serve is the attainment of this socially-situated individual self-fulfilment”.270  
 
The individual self-fulfilment the protection of property must serve, Froneman J then pointed 
out, “is not primarily to advance economic wealth maximisation or the satisfaction of individual 
preferences, but to secure living a life of dignity in recognition of the dignity of others.  And 
where the holding of property is related to the exercise, protection or advancement of particular 
individual rights under the Bill of Rights, the level of the protection afforded to that holding will 
be stronger than where no relation of that kind exists.”271 
 
After setting out these principles, Froneman J turned to apply them to the facts. In this respect he 
began by explaining that the determination of whether an interest is property for the purposes of 
section 25 is an objective test.272 This test seeks to establish a link between the holding of the 
interest in question and the achievement of personal self-fulfilment which is constitutive of one’s 
dignity.273  
 
“The important distinction between an objective enquiry and a subjective one is illustrated by the question 
whether Shoprite’s interest in the grocer’s wine licence is one that conceivably serves individual self-
fulfilment, not in the sense of mere commercial well-being, but in the sense of running a business as work 
that forms part of “one’s identity and constitutive of one’s dignity”?  If it is, then, on the strength of the 
close correlation between the holding of the licence and the fundamental right to choose one’s trade or 
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vocation, a finding that it is property for the purposes of section 25(1) is likely.”274  
 
The fact that Shoprite Checkers was not a natural person, but rather a juristic one and, therefore, 
could not experience individual self-fulfilment, Froneman J pointed out further, was not the end 
of the matter. Given that the constitutional validity of the ECLA had to be determined on an 
objective basis, the Court had to establish whether the ECLA was unconstitutional and invalid 
not only with respect to juristic persons, but also with respect to natural persons who could 
experience individual self-fulfilment. The key question that had to be determined, therefore, was 
whether a liquor licence could promote the individual self-fulfilment of a natural persons.275 
 
The answer to this question, Froneman J went on to point out, was simple. This is because it was 
easy to imagine that a grocer’s wine licence could promote the individual self-fulfilment of a 
person who owned a small grocery store and who needed to sell wine together with groceries in 
order to run her business successfully and, consequently, that this particular business choice was 
“essential to her living a life of dignity in that there was a “relationship between [her] work and 
[her] human personality as a whole”.276 The fact that Shoprite was a juristic person, according to 
the Justice, did not affect the “objective nature of the constitutional challenge”.277  
 
Having made these points, Froneman J then pointed out that there was nothing in the Liquor Act 
or the ECLA which suggested that a grocer’s wine licence could not be “held by a person who 
needs to live a life of individual self-fulfilment and reciprocal dignity to others”. It followed, 
therefore, that a grocer’s wine licence was property for the purposes of section 25 of the 
Constitution.278 
 
Having found that a grocer’s wine license was property for the purposes of section 25, Froneman 
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J turned to consider whether Shoprite Checkers had been deprived of its property by the ECLA 
and, if so, whether the ECLA was arbitrary.279 In this respect he found that while Shoprite 
Checkers had been deprived of its property by the ECLA, the ECLA was not arbitrary.280 The 
ECLA, therefore, was constitutionally valid.281  
 
     Madlanga J 
 
In his concurring judgment on this issue, Madlanga J also found that a grocer’s wine license is 
property for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but for different reasons.  
 
In arriving at this conclusion he began his analysis by criticising the values-based approach 
adopted by Froneman J. Madlanga J pointed out in this respect that although all there is no doubt 
that fundamental right are interrelated, the problem with the values-based approach is that it 
placed too much reliance on the link between the right to property and other constitutional rights 
and thus “water[ed] down the potency of the right to property to the point where it does little 
more than ride on the coast-tails of rights such as human dignity and freedom of trade, 
occupation and profession”.282 In addition, Madlanga J pointed out further, there was no 
authority for this approach in any of the Constitutional Court’s previous section 25 judgments.283 
 
After making these criticisms, Madlanga J turned to consider whether a grocer’s wine licence 
could be defined as constitutional property. In this respect he started by pointing out that in 
Opperman, the Constitutional Court had accepted that an enrichment claim fell into the 
constitutional definition of property on the grounds that it was “logical and realistic” to do so. 
Given that an enrichment claim can be enforced only “against a specific person” and can 
“rendered completely valueless” following a successful defence and, therefore, was more 
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tenuous and further removed from the constitutional concept of property than a grocer’s wine 
licence was, Madlanga J pointed out further, there was no reason why a grocer’s wine licence 
could not be defined as constitutional property.284 
 
In addition, and even more importantly, Madlanga J then pointed out, a grocer’s wine licence has 
many, if not most, of the attributes of property. It grants the holder an “entitlement to sell wine 
under certain specified circumstances”; it may “endure indefinitely”; and it may be suspended or 
cancelled only on circumscribed grounds and in accordance with the principles of just 
administrative action as provided for in the PAJA. Furthermore, a grocer’s wine licence has an 
“objective commercial value” and is transferable, although subject to the permission of the 
relevant authorities. “As an item with objective economic value, the transfer may even be for a 
valuable consideration (quid pro quo)”.  If an object, right or interest has the same attributes as 
the private law concept of property, Madlanga J concluded, then it should be defined as 
constitutional property.285  
 
Having found that the grocer’s wine license was property for the purposes of section 25, 
Madlanga J turned to consider whether Shoprite Checkers had been deprived of its property by 
the ECLA and, if so, whether the ECLA was arbitrary. In this respect he found that Shoprite 
Checkers had been deprived of its property by the ECLA and that the ECLA was arbitrary. The 
ECLA, therefore, was constitutionally invalid.286  
 
     Moseneke DCJ 
 
In his minority judgment on this issue, Moseneke DCJ began by pointing out that it was not 
necessary for the Constitutional Court to decide whether a grocer’s wine licence could be defined 
as constitutional property. This is because this was a “difficult and fluid question” and the 
dispute could be resolved by applying the test for rationality which is an aspect of the principle 
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of legality, rather than the test for sufficient reason which is an aspect of the requirement of non-
arbitrariness in section 25(1) of the Constitution.287  
 
Despite coming to this conclusion, Moseneke DCJ, went on to consider whether a grocer’s wine 
licence could be defined as constitutional property. In this respect he started his analysis by 
pointing out that Shoprite Checkers had not been deprived of the right to trade in alcohol. 
Instead, it had been deprived of the right to trade in alcohol together with food from the same 
premises. In other words, it had been deprived of a “business strategy and model that it prefers 
and cherishes”. The key question that had to be answered, therefore, was whether a preferred 
business strategy could be defined as property for the purposes of section 25.288  
 
In order to answer this question, Moseneke DCJ pointed out further, it was necessary to 
determine whether the constitutional concept of property should be extended to include so-called 
“new property” such as social welfare benefits, employment benefits and, especially, commercial 
licences. In some foreign jurisdictions these sorts of public entitlements have been included in 
the constitutional concept of property and in others they have not, depending on their 
constitutional and social context. It is important to note, however, that even in those countries in 
which public entitlements have been included, not every form of government largesse is seen as 
property and, in particular, those that do not have any of the characteristics of property.289 
 
The problem with public law entitlements, Moseneke DCJ went on to point out, is that: 
 
“they are generally ‘by their very nature contingent on mutable government policies or programmes’. Badenhorst et 
al state that they may be ‘withdrawn or reduced unilaterally by administrative authorities’. The learned authors add 
that the withdrawal of the entitlements, thereby invoking compensation requirements, would have a depressing 
effect on development of welfare policies and programs, by securing the position of current beneficiaries at the 
expense of the public interest in policies and programmes that are adaptable according to changing circumstances. 
They state further that in most other jurisdictions, these types of interests are not easily accepted as property for the 
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purposes of the threshold test, although nuanced acknowledgement and protection of these interests does at times 
occur. Welfare payments and subsidies generally would not pass the threshold test, but pension interests may under 
some circumstances be regarded as property”.290 
 
The decision in foreign jurisdictions to include public law entitlements in the constitutional 
concept of property, Moseneke DCJ then concluded, can usually be traced back to the fact that 
their Constitutions do not protect these sorts of entitlements from legislative and executive 
excesses. The South African Constitution is different. This is because it not only protects a very 
wide range of fundamental human rights, including an impressive set of social and economic 
rights, but also because it provides that every exercise of public power must comply with the 
principle of legality and the test for rationality. Every exercise of public power, therefore, is 
subject to judicial review. Given these features of the South African Constitution, it is not 
necessary to convert every conceivable object, right or interest into protectable property.291 
 
After setting out these principles, Moseneke DCJ turned to consider whether liquor licences 
should be defined as property for the purposes of section 25.  
 
In this respect the Deputy Chief Justice started by pointing out that one of the objectives of 
regulation the liquor industry through the use of liquor licences was to impose control over the 
access to and use of a dangerous substance that has the potential to cause negative socio-
economic consequences. Another objective was to maximise the economic benefits of trading in 
liquor and to balance these benefits against the harmful consequences of alcohol use. If a liquor 
was defined as constitutionally property a strong entitlement would be placed in the hands of the 
licence holder and this could “tip the scales and arguably diminish the ability of the Legislature 
to effectively regulate an industry where regulation is of paramount importance”.292  
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Apart from the fact that it could diminish the ability of the Legislature to regulate the liquor 
industry, Moseneke DCJ pointed out further, there is another reason why a liquor licence should 
not be defined as constitutional property: it does not actually possess the attributes that are 
normally associated with the concept of property. This is because a licence is “a bare permission 
to do something that would otherwise be unlawful and is usually issued to overcome a statutory 
prohibition. In addition, a licence is subject to administrative withdrawal and change. 
Furthermore, they are “never absolute, often conditional and frequently time bound”. They are 
never there for the taking, but are subject to specified pre-conditions. Over time a licence holder 
may also cease to be suitable to hold the licence”, they are not freely transferrable and do not 
vest in their holders.293 
 
Defining a liquor licence as constitutional property, Moseneke DCJ concluded, could also result 
in “very difficult property jurisprudence”.294 This is because the wider the definition of 
constitutional property, the narrower the definition of deprivation and arbitrariness would have to 
be. It might also open the floodgates of litigation. This is because as every cancellation or change 
in licencing law could potentially result in a constitutional challenge based on the property 
clause.295 In addition, such an approach “would impermissibly limit the legislative competence 
of the provinces”.296 
 
Like Madlanga J, Moseneke DCJ also criticised the approach adopted by Froneman J. He was of 
the view that: 
 
“The objective evaluation of whether a liquor license is property cannot be premised on a speculative claim to other 
fundamental rights of an individual’s human dignity, occupation and freedom, particularly on the part of a 
substantial corporate trader. This Court in FNB implied that one should look at the objective inherent value of the 
right or interest to determine if it constitutes “property”. If the core nature of a liquor license is permission, then 
subjective interests like economic and commercial value, let alone human dignity and vocation of choice and liberty 
                                                          
293 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 123. 
294 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 125. 
295 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 125. 
296 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 125. 
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are of little assistance in themselves. FNB made it clear that “[n]either the subjective interest of the owner in the 
thing owned nor the economic value of the right of ownership . . . can determine the characterisation of the right”. 
Economic and commercial interests, whether objective or subjective, are part and parcel of these permissions. The 
inherent limitation in the core attribute of a liquor license cannot be played down and supplanted by other rights in 
the Constitution in order to justify a finding of “property” which otherwise does not fit the objective enquiry.”297 
 
In his criticism of the main judgment, Moseneke DCJ also stated that; 
 
“There was indeed another route open to the main judgment in reaching its decision. The enquiry into arbitrary 
deprivation in substance is no different from the enquiry into rationality of the impugned statute. If the impugned 
statute had authorised a wanton and irrational termination of the liquor licenses of Shoprite in a law that was not 
properly related to public good, it would have been constitutionally bad. The holder of the permission would have 
the same substantive constitutional protection. Moreover, the approach that some courts have adopted was to place 
little emphasis on the threshold question of “property”. An example is that of Transkei Public Servants 
Association193 and of Law Society, where the Court stated that “[h]appily, in this case, given the conclusion I 
reach, it is unnecessary to resolve the debate whether a claim for loss of earning capacity or for loss of support 
constitutes ‘property ’”.298 
 
Moseneke DCJ found that Shoprite Checkers’ preferred business model did not qualify as 
“property” for the purposes of the Constitution.299 In so far as the constitutionality of the ECLA 
was concerned, he concurred with Froneman J’s finding that the provisions of the ECLA were 
constitutionally valid.300 
 
     Conclusion 
 
The Shoprite Checkers case is the first case in which the Constitutional Court has stretched the 
definition of constitutional property to include an interest which is a public law entitlement. The 
Court was divided into three and a bare majority, 6 out of 11 found that the liquor license 
                                                          
297 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 127. 
298 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 129. 
299 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 130.  
300 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 91. 
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constitutes constitutional property. This bare majority was constituted by Froneman J and 
Madlanga J’s findings. The Court was however divided into three with regard to the approach to 
be followed when determining whether a commercial license constitute constitutional property. 
 
Froneman J adopted a values-based approach. He regarded the fundamental values of the 
Constitution as playing a key role in the determination of constitutional property.301 He also set 
out an objective test in which the court has to assess whether the interest is such that it is 
necessary for the attainment of the individual’s self-fulfilment. In addition to this, Froneman J 
also examined the characteristics of the Grocer’s Wine Licence and found that it constituted a 
personal enrichment claim and that this strengthened the justification for its inclusion within the 
ambit of the constitutional concept of property.  
 
Madlanga J, on the other hand, adopted a private-law-style approach. Inasmuch as he set out the 
context and history within whose framework the constitutional concept of property must be 
interpreted, when it came to the issue at hand, he focused only on the characteristics of the 
interest.  He was of the view that if an object or interest has the characteristics of ‘property’, then 
it should be regarded as such.302 Unlike Froneman J and Madlanga J, Moseneke DCJ was of the 
view that it was unnecessary to decide on the complex issue of property in this case.303 He 
proposed that the court should instead use the rationality test to resolve the property dispute.304 
Moseneke DCJ then looked at the purpose served by the regulation of liquor licences, he found 
that protecting the grocer’s wine license under the property clause would obstruct the function of 
the legislation in as far as the regulation of liquor is concerned. Like the other Justices, 
Moseneke DCJ also examined the characteristics of the grocer’s wine licence. He however 
concluded that it did not qualify for constitutional protection. 
 
                                                          
301 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 44 and 46. 
302 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 143. 
303 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 94. 
304 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 94.  
69 
 
As can be seen in the discussion above, the judgments delivered by Froneman J, Madlanga J and 
Moseneke DCJ all adopted very different approaches. It is therefore important to note that 
though the Court found that a Grocer’s Wine License granted by the state to a juristic person 
constitutes constitutionally protected property, there was, however, no majority ruling in as far as 
the approach for the determination of constitutional property is concerned. As such, it is still 






CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
   Introduction 
 
In each of their respective judgments, Froneman J, Madlanga J and Moseneke DCJ engaged in a 
comparative analysis, although Froneman J appears to have done so in the greatest depth. This is 
not surprising for two reasons. First, the Constitution expressly provides that when a court, 
tribunal or forum interprets the Bill of Rights it “may consider foreign law”.305 Second, the 
question whether commercial licences and other public law entitlements should fall into the 
constitutional concept of property has been considered by the courts in comparable foreign 
jurisdictions, and especially by the European Court of Human Rights as well as the courts in 
Germany, and the United States. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly examine the approach 
followed in these jurisdictions with a specific emphasis on the extent to which they have 
recognised commercial licences as constitutional property. Each jurisdiction will be discussed in 
turn. 
 
   The European Court of Human Rights 
 
   Introduction 
 
The right to property is guaranteed in Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (the “Convention”). This Article states that: 
 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.  
 
                                                          
305 Section 39(1)(c). Insofar as constitutional property law is concerned, Van der Walt and Walsh point out that 
“[c]omparatively speaking there are significant divergences internationally in how state powers over private 
property are controlled by constitutions. Many of these divergences stem from textual differences in the framing of 
constitutional property guarantees, and from the varied treatment of property rights in civilian and common law 
legal systems. However, most jurisdictions that protect property rights at a constitutional level encounter similar 
issues in the interpretation and application of such protection…” (see AJ van der Walt and R Walsh “Comparative 
constitutional property law” in M Graziddei and L Smith (eds) Comparative Property Law: Global Perspective 
(2017) at 193). 
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties”.306 
 
In Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden307 the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) 
identified three rules which are to be considered when resolving property disputes: 
 
“The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in 
the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain 
conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States are 
entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing 
such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the second paragraph. The Court must 
determine, before considering whether the first rule was complied with, whether the last two are applicable.”308 
 
The protection of property within the Convention evidently seeks to achieve two main purposes. 
It seeks to allow the government to “adopt or modify economic and social policies implicating 
private property, without in every instance, compensating adversely affected owners. On the 
other hand, the drafters also understood that the rule of law in general and the stability and 
predictability of property rights in particular would be undermined if governments could 
arbitrarily deprive owners of their possessions”.309  
 
Before the ECHR can decide whether an interference with an object, right or interest violates 
Article 1 Protocol 1 it must first ascertain whether the object, right or interest in question can be 
classified as a “possession” for the purposes of the Convention. The concept of a “possession” 
for the purposes of the Convention has been interpreted broadly and, consequently, various 
forms of intangible property rights including some public law entitlements are accepted as falling 
within the ambit of this concept. 
 
   The constitutional concept of property 
                                                          
306 European Commission on Human Rights (1950). 
307 Application no. 7151/75; 7152/75 (1982). 
308 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden application no. 7151/75; 7152/75 (1982) at para 61. 
309 LR Helfer “The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights” 




Like the Constitutional Court, the ECHR has accepted that the concept of a “possession” 
encompasses corporeal movables and immovables. In Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden,310 the 
Court held that the ownership of immovable property is protected under Article 1 Protocol 1. In 
this case, the Stockholm City Council wanted to redevelop land which formed a part of the 
applicants’ estate, and as a result, it acquired a permit authorising the expropriation of the land 
and prohibiting construction on it. The applicants argued that the looming expropriation had 
gone on for too long and that this affected their right to “peacefully enjoy their possessions”.311 
The ECHR found that the interest held by the applicant was indeed a “possession” and that the 
prohibitions significantly affected the exercise of the owners’ rights to use and dispose of their 
property.312  
 
Apart from the right of ownership, the ECHR has extended the concept of a “possession” to 
include the entitlements of ownership, such as the entitlement to access property. In Loizidou v 
Turkey313, an applicant who owned properties in northern Cyprus approached the Court because 
the Turkish government had occupied this area and thereby prevented her from accessing her 
properties.314 Although the properties themselves had not been interfered with, the Court found 
that the government of Turkey had interfered with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of her 
possessions as she had “effectively lost all control over, as well as all possibilities to use and 
enjoy her property”.315  
 
Besides ownership and the entitlements of ownership, the ECHR has held that the concept of a 
“possession” also encompasses various forms of intangible property rights. In Beyeler v Italy,316 
                                                          
310 Application no. 7151/75; 7152/75 (1982). 
311 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden application no. 7151/75; 7152/75 (1982) at para 11-18. 
312 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden application no. 7151/75; 7152/75 (1982). In Gasus Dosier – und Fordertechnik 
GmbH v the Netherlands application no. 15375/89 (1995) the ECHR expressly held that the ownership of a movable 
– in this case, a cement mixer – also fell into the concept of a “possession” and was protected by Article 1 Protocol 
1. In Gasus Dosier–und Fordertechnik GmbH v the Netherlands application no. 15375/89 (1995) the ECHR 
expressly held that the ownership of a movable – in this case, a cement mixer – also fell into the concept of a 
“possession” and was protected by Article 1 Protocol 1. 
313 Application no. 15318/89 (1996). 
314 Loizidou v Turkey application no. 15318/89 (1996) at para 12. 
315 Loizidou v Turkey application no. 15318/89 (1996) at para 63. 
316 Application no. 33202/96 (2000). 
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for example, the Court held that the scope and ambit of the concept of a “possession” is not only 
independent from, but also much wider than the scope and ambit of a typical domestic private 
law concept of “property”.317 The Court stated in this respect that “possession in the first part of 
article 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is 
independent from the formal classification in domestic law.”318  
 
The ambit of the concept of property as protected in Article 1 Protocol 1, accordingly extends to 
interests such as income and goodwill. In Van Marle and Others v the Netherlands,319 the ECHR 
had the opportunity to decide whether both these interests qualify for protection under Article 1 
Protocol 1. The applicants in this case were practicing accountants who did not meet the 
specified qualifications to be registered as certified accountants.320 They could, however, apply 
to get registered as certified accountants, but when they applied, the Board of Appeals refused to 
grant them their registrations.321 They argued that the decision made by the Board of Appeals 
had reduced their income and goodwill and thereby interfered with their rights to enjoy their 
possessions peacefully.322 The Court found that they could rely on Article 1 Protocol 1 to protect 
these interests.323 The Court also accepted in Iatridis v Greece324 that the goodwill of a cinema is 
a “possession” even though the applicant did not own the property from which he operated the 
cinema.325  
 
Company shares are also protected as “possessions” for the purposes of the Convention. In 
Bramelid and Malmstrom v Sweden,326 the ECHR had to decide whether company shares are 
included within the ambit of Article 1 Protocol 1. The Court in casu reasoned that “a company 
share is a complex thing: certifying that the holder possesses a share in the company, together 
with the corresponding rights (esp voting rights) it also constitutes as it were an indirect claim to 
the company’s assets. In the present case there is no doubt that the NK shares had an economic 
                                                          
317 Beyeler v Italy application no. 33202/96 (2000) at para 100. 
318 Beyeler v Italy application no. 33202/96 (2000) at para 100. 
319 Application no. 8543/79; 8674/79; 8675/79; 8685/79 (1986). 
320 Van Marle and Others v the Netherlands application no. 8543/79; 8674/79; 8675/79; 8685/79 (1986) at para 39. 
321 Van Marle and Others v the Netherlands application no. 8543/79; 8674/79; 8675/79; 8685/79 (1986) at para 39. 
322 Van Marle and Others v the Netherlands application no. 8543/79; 8674/79; 8675/79; 8685/79 (1986) at para 39. 
323 Van Marle and Others v the Netherlands application no. 8543/79; 8674/79; 8675/79; 8685/79 (1986). 
324 Application no. 31107/96 (1999). 
325 Iatridis v Greece application no. 31107/96 (1999). 
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value . . . shares held by the applicants were indeed ‘possessions’ giving rise to a right of 
ownership”.327 
 
Article 1 Protocol 1’s protection of property interests has been extended to include intellectual 
property as well. In Smith Kline and French Laboratories v the Netherlands,328 the ECHR 
accepted that a patent for drugs received under the domestic patent act was a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1 Protocol 1. The Court even extended Article 1 Protocol 1’s protection of 
intellectual property to include an application for a trademark registration in Anheuser–Busch 
Inc. v Portugal.329 The applicant in this case, a beer brewing company, argued that by not 
overturning the decision of the relevant authorities to deny the registration of their trademark, the 
Portuguese courts had violated their right to enjoy their possessions. The Court accepted that the 
application for a trademark fell within the bounds of Article 1 Protocol 1.330 
 
Although in earlier decisions, rights and interests could be included within the scope and ambit 
of Article 1 Protocol 1 only if they had vested, the ECHR has now extended the scope of its 
concept of possession to include delictual claims and legitimate expectations. In Slivenko and 
Others v Latvia,331 the Court stated that “possessions” can be “existing  possessions” or assets, 
including claims by virtue of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a 
“legitimate expectation” of acquiring effective enjoyment of a property right”.332 This wide 
approach was confirmed in Stretch v the United Kingdom,333 where the Court found that an 
expectation of renewal of a lease entered into with the local municipality was a legitimate 
expectation and that it qualified for protection under Article 1 Protocol 1. In Pressos Compania 
Naviera SA and Others v Belgium334 the Court also confirmed that claims arising from 
negligence are “possessions”. It did go on to hold, however, that not all claims will qualify for 
protection.335 
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   The constitutional concept of property and public law entitlements 
 
Both the European Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”) and the ECHR have held 
that the concept of a “possession” in Article 1 Protocol 1 is wide enough to include a variety of 
public law entitlements. In Domalewski v Poland,336 for example, the Commission held that 
“rights stemming from the payment of contributions to the social insurance system, in particular 
the right to derive benefits from such a system - for instance in the form of a pension - can be 
asserted under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.337 And in Klein v Austria,338 the ECHR held that a 
pension which a person has contributed to through his or her own effort is included within the 
meaning of “possessions”. The Court adopted the same approach to those cases in which a 
person is entitled to claim emergency assistance and the assistance is linked to his or her pension 
contributions.339 In both cases, the Court stressed the importance of a direct link between the 
contribution made and the expectation to receive the benefits.  
 
Despite emphasizing the importance of own effort in pension cases, the ECHR has held that 
certain welfare entitlements also fall into the concept of a “possession” for the purposes of 
Article 1 Protocol 1, even where there has been no own effort. In Ponomarenko v Russia,340 for 
example, the applicant was entitled to be provide with housing and a court order had been issued 
in terms of domestic law confirming this right. The state, however, had failed to enforce the 
court order for a period of three years. The Court held that the failure to enforce the court order 
infringed the applicant’s right to the peaceful use and enjoyment of his “possessions” in terms of 
Article 1 Protocol 1. The Court was faced with a similar situation in Nagovitysn v Russia.341 In 
this case, the applicant as a result of his disability was entitled to social benefits which included 
the provision of a house.342 A court judgment stating that he must be provided with a house had 
been granted in domestic law, but the state had failed to enforce it for more than three years.343 
                                                          
336 Application no. 34610/97 (1999). 
337 Domalewski v Poland application no. 34610/97 (1999). 
338 Application no. 57028/00 (2014). 
339 Gaygusuz v Austria application no. 48321/99 (2002) at para 121. 
340 Application no. 14656/03 (2007). 
341 Application no. 6859/02 (2018). 
342 Nagovitysn v Russia application no. 6859/02 (2018) at para 5. 
343 Nagovitysn v Russia application no. 6859/02 (2018) at para 15. 
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The Court in this case also unanimously found that the right to housing in question could be 
protected under Article 1 Protocol 1 and that the “unjustified delay in the enforcement of the 
judgment” was a violation of this right.344 
 
Apart from pension benefits and the right to housing, the ECHR has extended the meaning of 
“possessions” to include interests arising from licenses and permits. In Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag 
v Sweden345 the Court had to determine whether a license to sell various types of alcoholic 
beverages, including wine, constituted property for the purposes of the Convention.346 It 
concluded that Article 1 Protocol 1 was applicable in this case because “the economic interests 
connected with the running of Le Cardinal were ‘possessions’ for the purposes of Article 1 of the 
Protocol . . . the maintenance of the licence was one of the principal conditions for the carrying 
on of the applicant company’s business . . . its withdrawal had adverse effects on the goodwill 
and value of the restaurant . . . ”347 In Fredin v Sweden348 the Court also found that a permit to 
extract gravel qualifies for protection as a “possession” and in Pine Valley Developments Limited 
and Others v Ireland,349 the Court found that permission for planning also falls within the 
bounds of Article 1 Protocol 1. 
 
In light of these judgments, McCarthy points out that “it now seems settled that where legislation 
provides for a public law benefit, a private property right may emerge, much in line with Reich’s 
thinking. A possession of that kind may still be removed by the State, but as with any other 
private property right, such action would have to be lawful, in the public interest, and 
proportionate”.350 Inasmuch as the Convention interprets “possession” in a broad manner, its 
protection does not, however, extend to every conceivable interest. Article 1 Protocol 1 does not 
protect interest that are mere expectations. For example an expectation to inherit as was decided 
                                                          
344 Nagovitysn v Russia application no. 6859/02 (2018). 
345 Application no. 10873/84 (1989). 
346 Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden application no. 10873/84 (1989) at para 33. 
347 Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden application no. 10873/84 (1989) at para 43. 
348 Application no. 12633/86 (1991). 
349 Application no. 12742/87 (1991). 
350 F McCarthy “Protection of Property and the Europeans Convention on Human Rights” Property Rights 
Conference Journal (2017) 6 at 321. 
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by the Court in Marckx v Belgium.351 The Court in this case found that the applicant could not 
rely on the protection afforded by Article 1 Protocol 1. 
 
   Germany 
 
   Introduction 
 
The right to property is guaranteed in Article 14 of the Basic Law which stipulates that: 
 
“(i)  Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their substance and limits shall be determined by 
law. 
(ii)  Property entails obligations. Its use should also serve the public interest. 
(iii)  Expropriation shall only be permissible in the public interest. It may only be ordered by or pursuant to a 
law which determines the nature and extent of compensation. Compensation shall reflect a balance between 
the public interest and the interest of those affected. In case of dispute regarding amount of compensation 
recourse may be had to ordinary courts”.352 
 
The values on which the Basic Law is based play a key role in the interpretation of its provisions. 
The value of dignity especially plays a central role in this regard. The other values include 
democracy,353 social state,354 Rechtsstaat (constitutional state),355 republicanism and 
                                                          
351 Application no. 6833/74 (1979). 
352 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, official translation published by the Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, revised and updated edition June 1994.  
353 W Heun The Constitution of Germany: A contextual analysis (2011) at 30. The principle of democracy has been 
interpreted as referring to the “idea of free self-determination or autonomy” and not just democratic governance 
354 W Heun The Constitution of Germany: A contextual analysis (2011) at 45. See also DP Kommers and RA Miller 
The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3ed (2012) at 50, Kommers and Miller 
translate the Lisbon case where the Federal Constitutional Court stated that the social state is “an essential part 
of…Germany’s ‘constitutional identity,’ a distinctiveness that cannot be sacrificed to any other value of the Basic 
Law.” The function of the social state principle is to ensure that the state has the power to interfere with individual 
rights where it is in the public interest to do so. In other words, the social state principle places a duty on the arms of 
government to promote social welfare. 
355 W Heun The Constitution of Germany: A contextual analysis (2011) at 35-41. The Rechtsstaat principle 
encompasses the principles of legality, supremacy of the constitution and the rights to approach the courts for 
judicial recourse. See also DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 43 where it is further explained that supremacy of the constitution means that any statute 
which is not consistent with the provisions of the basic law will be deemed both unconstitutional and void. This is 
expressly articulated in article 19(2) of the Basic Law which outlaws any law or governmental conduct that violates 
‘the essential content of [any] basic right”. 
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federalism.356 These values are regarded as being “the essential core and identity of the 
Constitution” and as such, they can never be amended.357 The property right, therefore, must be 
interpreted purposively so as to ensure the realisation of these constitutional goals. As pointed 
out by Kommers and Miller, the Basic Law is not regarded as being a mere rule book, it does not 
only seek to protect rights but to also “foster a secure and preferred way of life”.358  
 
When interpreting the meaning of property for the purposes of the Basic Law, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court has adopted a broad approach which has allowed the inclusion of 
various intangible property rights including some interests arising from public law. This section 
will discuss the approach that has been taken by the German courts when interpreting 
constitutional property and particularly how they have extended this concept to include public 
law entitlements.  
 
  The constitutional concept of property 
 
The German private law concept of property is a narrow one which provides for an absolute and 
exclusive property right whose sole purpose is the protection of the individual from any 
interference with their property rights.359 It is protected in section 903 of the German Civil Code 
which states that the property holder has the discretion to deal with their thing as they wish and 
they can even exclude others from interfering with their right of ownership.360 Given that the 
private law concept of property applies only to corporeal objects, property in a private law sense 
is viewed as being a relationship between persons with regard to the corporeal objects that they 
own.361  
 
                                                          
356 D Kleyn “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between The German and South African 
approach” (1996) 11 SAPR/PL at 406.  
357 W Heun The Constitution of Germany: A contextual analysis (2011) at 29. See also DP Kommers and RA Miller 
The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3ed (2012) at 43. 
358 DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3ed (2012) at 
47. 
359 AJ van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause (1997) at 47. See also D Kleyn “The constitutional 
protection of property: A comparison between The German and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPR/PL at 
419. 
360 German Civil Code English translations. Available at: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html., accessed on 21 February 2018. 
361 AJ van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause (1997) at 32. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that both the German Civil Code and the Basic Law use the same term 
(eiugentum) to refer to property, the German Federal Constitutional Court has rejected the view 
that “property” in the constitutional sense has the same meaning as “property” in the private law 
sense. In the Hamburg Flood Control case, the Court held that “the notion of property as 
guaranteed by the Constitution must be derived from the Constitution itself [it] cannot be fixed 
by ordinary statutes ranking below the Constitution, nor can the range of the guaranteed right be 
determined on the basis of private law.”362 An important consequence of this approach, the Court 
held further, is that the constitutional concept of property cannot be restricted to the objects and 
rights protected under the very narrow private law definition of “property”. Instead, the 
constitutional concept of property has to be interpreted in a manner that not only protects the 
individual’s liberty, but also promotes his or her ability to lead a “self-governing life”.363  
 
The requirement that the object, right or interest should promote the realization of the 
individual’s freedom will, however, not be satisfied by showing mere economic advantage. In 
the Groundwater Cases the German Federal Constitutional Court held that “[f]rom the 
constitutional guarantee of property, the owner cannot derive a right to be permitted to make use 
of precisely that which promises the greatest possible economic advantage.”364 The Court, 
therefore, will not accept the argument that an object, right or interest constitutes constitutional 
property merely because it has significant patrimonial benefits for the holder. The protection of 
property as a constitutional right is evidently more concerned with protecting the individual’s 
freedom and not the patrimonial value of the object of the right. 
 
Inasmuch as there seems to be an emphasis on individual property rights, the German 
constitutional concept of property also has a social aspect. As explained in the Investment Aid 
Case: 
 
                                                          
362 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 634. 
363 See translation in GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 
88:733 Cornell Law Review at 746. 
364 See translation in GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 
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“The image of humankind in the Basic Law is not that of isolated, sovereign individuals. On the contrary, the Basic 
Law has resolved the tension between individual and society in favour of coordination and interdependence with the 
community without touching the intrinsic value of the person.”365 
 
In some cases, the German Federal Constitutional Court has actually relied on the public purpose 
or public interest to justify the inclusion or exclusion of interests from the ambit of Article 14.366 
As Alexander puts it “the nature and social function of certain categories of property is such that 
exclusive, autonomous individual rights in that property cannot be reconciled with the enormous 
importance and potential dangers which the private use and exploitation of that property might 
have for society as a whole”.367 For example, in the Hamburg Flood Control case the Court held 
that because groundwater serves an important public function it cannot be protected as an 
individual constitutional property interest.368 And in the Contergan case the Court found that it 
was in the public interest to constitutionally protect a private law delictual interest as this would 
ensure that the compensation fund would be distributed in a just manner and that other victims 
who were not part of the case would still be allowed to claim from the fund.369  
 
The German Federal Constitutional Court has adopted a wide meaning insofar as the objects, 
rights and interests protected by Article 14 are concerned. Like many other jurisdictions, the 
starting point for the constitutional concept of property is the private law notion of property. As 
such, all the property interests protected under German private law are included within its 
                                                          
365 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 625. 
366 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) at 131. See also D Kleyn “The 
Constitutional Protection of Property: A comparison Between The German and South African Approach” (1996) 11 
SAPR/PL at 409 where Kleyn explains that the focus on individual rights in a consequence of Germany’s history; he 
states that the property right “was developed as a means of freeing the individual from the bondage of medieval 
feudalism…It served to counteract the political powers of the landlords and to make individual ownership of land 
possible, as well as to enable the individual to participate in a free market system”. 
367 GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell 
Law Review at 130. 
368 DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3ed (2012) at 
641. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) at 130. In casu, The German 
Federal Constitutional Court was of the view that an owner of land cannot be said to have a constitutional property 
right in the groundwater merely because that is the nature of things according to private law ownership. The court 
further reasoned that, “the definition of property is not the exclusive domain of private law. The institutional 
guarantee is not adversely affected when public law intrudes to protect and defend aspects of property vital to the 
well-being of the general public.”368 The court held that because groundwater rights are of a public nature it was 
therefore important to regulate the use of this public resource, hence, the legislature had operated within its authority 
when it limited the scope of the rights of the land owner.368 
369 See translation in AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) at 131. 
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constitutional concept of property. The German courts have however found that constitutional 
property also includes interests that do not stem from the traditional property right of ownership. 
In the Tenant’s Right of Occupancy case, for example, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
accepted that a tenant’s right to lease an apartment falls within the scope and ambit of the 
constitutional notion of property.370 The Court reasoned that:  
 
(a)  The home is essential for the realization of personal freedom and development and that in  
the case of a tenant, the right to lease allows the tenant to access this freedom in a manner 
similar to that of a real right.371 
(b)  The holder of the right to lease has the exclusive right to use the property without 
disturbance for the duration of the lease.372 
(c)  The right to lease “has value as an asset”.373 
 
Several intangible interests have been accepted as constituting constitutional property. In the 
Thalidomide case the German Federal Constitutional Court accepted that delictual claims for 
compensation for victims of pregnancy drugs are protected under the property clause.374 In casu, 
the Court considered that protecting such claims under public law would be in the public interest 
considering that it was very likely that more victims who had not been part of the delictual claim 
would come forward; hence, it was important that the compensation be closely monitored by the 
state to ensure that they are also compensated.375 In the Schoolbook case376 it was held that a 
                                                          
370 See translation in DP Kommers and RAMiller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 635. In an earlier judgment, Small Garden Plot case (1959) the German Federal 
Constitutional Court found that legislation that limited the power of landowners to terminate plot leases was 
unjustified; see translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic 
of Germany 3ed (2012) at 639. In another case, Small Garden Plot, the court also held that a leases right to rent a 
garden plot constitutes constitutional property; see translation in GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental 
constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell Law Review at 639.  
371 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 635. 
372 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 635 and 636. 
373 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 636. 
374 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 640. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) at 131. 
Van der Walt refers to it as the Contergan case. 
375 See translation in AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) at 131. 
376 BVerfGE, 31 229. 
82 
 
copyright is “property” for the purposes of Article 14.377 And in the Clinical Trials case the 
Court held that a patent protected by the Patent Act is constitutionally protected property. 
 
   The constitutional concept of property and public law entitlements 
 
As the discussion set out above illustrates, generally speaking the constitutional concept of 
property in Germany encompasses all those rights and interests which are valuable, which have 
vested in the holder (not mere expectation) and which are concrete rights (not wealth).378 
However, where the right or interest in question is a public law entitlements there are additional 
requirements which must be satisfied before the public law entitlement can be defined as 
constitutional property. In this respect, the German Federal Constitutional Court has held that the 
right or interest in question must also be: (a) an exclusionary right awarded to the holder by the 
state; (b) derived from the property holder’s own effort or input; and (c) that the property right 
must be held for the purpose of ensuring “holder’s existence (survival)”.379 
 
Applying these requirements, the German Federal Constitutional Court has held that public law 
entitlements in the form of unemployment benefits,380 pensions381 and medical insurance fall into 
the constitutional concept of property.382 At the same time, however, they have also held that 
welfare entitlements do not fall into the constitutional concept property because they do not 
satisfy the additional requirements and especially the additional requirement of own effort or 
input.383 As Van der Walt points out, the decision to impose these additional requirements means 
that the Court will extend the constitutional protection of property only to those public law 
                                                          
377 See translation in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 3ed (2012) at 651. 
378 See translation of Glycol Wine case in DP Kommers and RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany 3ed (2012) at 636 where the German Federal Constitutional Court refused to future 
business opportunities and a business’s reputation. 
379 GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell 
Law Review at 763 to 764.  
380 BVerfGE, 72 9 at 22-25.  
381 BVerfGE, 53 257 at 308-311.  
382 BVerfGE, 69 272 at 304-307.  
383 GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell 
Law Review at 766. Some academics and judges have proposed that interests such as bursaries and state funded 
education should also be included within the constitutional concept of property, see D Kleyn “The constitutional 




entitlements that display the qualities of private property.384 An important consequence of the 
decision to adopt these additional requirements, therefore, is that it cannot really be said that the 
Court has embraced the inclusion of public law entitlements within the concept of property as 
envisioned by Charles Reich.385 
 
The German Federal Constitutional Court in its protection of public law entitlements has not 
only protected these interests from procedural violations but also from substantive violations; the 
court will inquire whether the state acted in a reasonable manner.386 Though these rights are 
protected substantively, “the German Federal Constitutional Court has decided that the public-
law rights funded as they are from public money, are relative to the state of the economy in the 
sense that their monetary value can be amended to suit the states’ financial situation…this 
principle means that laws and regulations that affect the monetary value or actual calculation 
cannot be attacked unless… [they also affect] the substance of a concrete right.”387  
 
   The United States of America 
 
   Introduction 
 
The right to property is guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States of America (the “United States”). The Fifth Amendment, which is 
commonly referred to as the “Takings Clause”, states that: 
 
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of 
war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
                                                          
384 M Kellerman The Constitutional Property Clause and Immaterial Property Interests Unpublished LLD Thesis, 
Stellenbosch University (2011) at 219. 
385 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) at 157. 
386 GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell 
Law Review at 767.  
387 AJ van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of the South African 
Constitution of 1996 (1997) at 35. 
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property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”.388 (my emphasis) 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment, which is commonly referred to as the “Due Process Clause”, states 
that: 
 
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”389 (my emphasis) 
 
Constitutional property in the United States must be understood in light of its core purpose or 
function. Alexander explains in this respect that in the United States property is viewed as a 
commodity; that is to say that its core purpose is to guarantee a free market.390 The emphasis, 
therefore, is on the protection of the freedom of the individual property holder by ensuring that 
regulatory provisions that affect this freedom are kept in check. 
 
   The constitutional concept of property 
 
Given that the Fifth Amendment obliges the state to pay just compensation only for “private 
property that has been taken for public use” and that the Fourteenth Amendment obliges the state 
to follow due process of law only where it deprives a person of “life, liberty or property”, it 
follows that a person who claims the protection of these clauses will have to prove that the state 
has either “taken” or “deprived” such a person of his or her “property”. The constitutional 
concept of property, therefore, is a threshold question.391  
 
                                                          
388 The Constitution of the United States of America 1787. 
389 The Constitution of the United States of America 1787. 
390 GS Alexander “Property as propriety” (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review at 668 and 669. Alexander also points out 
that before the emergence of this view, the United States courts regarded public good as being the important purpose 
of constitutional protection of property. 
391 Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth 408 U.S. 568 (1972). See also Bishop v Wood et al 426 U.S. 341 
(1976) at 343. 
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Despite the fact that the constitutional concept of property is a threshold question, it has not 
received as much attention in the United States as it has in other jurisdictions. This is largely 
because the private law concept of property in the United States is not restricted to real rights in 
corporeal movable and immovable objects. Instead, it encompasses various forms of intangible 
objects, rights and interests.392 As a result of the wide definition of the private law concept of 
property, the United States Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”) has accepted a wide range of 
private law rights and interests as constitutional property. These include flowage easements;393 
coal mining rights;394 temporary rights of occupation;395 liens;396 personal rights;397  
 
In addition, the constitutional concept of property has not received as much attention in the 
United States as in other jurisdictions because the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not create a new form of property. Instead, they simply protect 
property that has been created by the common law or by statute law. In Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v Roth,398 for example, the Supreme Court held that: 
 
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”399  
 
Finally, it is important to note that some intellectual property rights, for example patents and 
copyrights, are not protected as “property” by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because 
                                                          
392 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) at 106. Property issue is only dealt with where the court 
is concerned with where the court is faced with difficult cases which do not fit within the private law notion of 
property.  
393 United States v Virginia Electric Power Co 365 U.S. 624 (1961).  
394 Pennsylvania Coal Company v Mahon et al 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
395 United States v General Motors Corp 323 U.S. 373 (1945).  
396 United States v Security Industrial Bank et al 459 U.S. 70 (1982). 
397 Logan v Zimmermann Brush Co 455 U.S. 422 (1981). 
398 408 U.S. 568 (1972). 
399 Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth 408 U.S. 568 (1972) at para 577. FI Michelman “Property as a 
constitutional right: The annual John Randolph Tucker Lecture” (1981) 38 Washington and Lee Law Review at 
1103. Michelman argues that these existing laws are incapable of providing a comprehensive understanding of the 
scope and ambit of constitutional property. He further points out that an approach that relies completely on existing 




they are explicitly protected in Article 1 of the Constitution.400 Section 8 of Article 1 provides in 
this respect that United States Congress has the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries”.401 
 
   The constitutional concept of property and public law entitlements 
 
Although the Supreme Court relies mostly on the private law concept of property to decide what 
sorts of objects, rights and interests should be protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, it has also extended the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment (although not the 
Fifth Amendment) to certain public law entitlements.402 These decisions were based partly on 
article published by Professor Charles Reich in the Yale Law Journal entitled the New Property 
in 1964.403 
 
In this article Reich argued that because interests emanating from public law had become an 
important source of wealth, there was a need to protect them by recognising them as 
constitutional property.404 In his article, he advocated for both procedural and substantive 
protection of public law entitlements.405 The US Supreme Court has accepted that these interests 
qualify for protection as “property”, but only under the Fourteenth Amendment and not under the 
Fifth Amendment.406 What this means is that public law entitlements are only protected from 
unlawful procedural interferences and not unlawful substantive interferences. 
 
The first judgment in which the Supreme Court extended the protection provided by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to new property was Goldberg v Kelly.407 In this case the Supreme Court 
                                                          
400 A Mossoff “Patents as constitutional private property: The historical protection of patents under the takings 
clause” (2007) 87 Boston ULR at 690-691. 
401 The Constitution of the United States of America 1787. 
402 GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell 
Law Review at 767. 
403 CA Reich “The New Property” (1964) 73 Yale LJ. 
404 CA Reich “The New Property” (1964) 73 Yale LJ at 738. 
405 CA Reich “The New Property” (1964) 73 Yale LJ at 738. 
406 GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example.” (2003) 88:733 Cornell 
Law Review at 767. 
407 397 U.S 254 (1970). 
87 
 
held that a social welfare beneficiary’s right to due process had been violated by the termination 
of his welfare assistance. In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court held that “welfare 
benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive the, and procedural 
due process is applicable to their termination.”408 The approach adopted in Goldberg was 
confirmed in Mathews v Eldridge409 where the Supreme Court held that a disability grant fell 
within the constitutional definition of property for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and, consequently, that the applicant was entitled to a hearing before he could be denied the 
disability benefit.410 Unlike the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court did not 
apply the own effort requirement in any of these cases. 
 
Apart from social welfare rights and interests, the Supreme Court has also extended the 
protection provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to licence holders. In Bell v Burson,411 the 
Supreme Court held that a driving licence held by a clergyman who needed it to perform his 
duties qualified for protection under the Due Process Clause. In arriving at this decision, the 
Supreme Court stated that “once licences are issued, as in the petitioner’s case, their continued 
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood”.412 In such cases, the licence 
cannot be taken away without that procedural due process required by the fourteenth 
amendment.” And in Barry v Barchi413 the Supreme Court accepted a horse racing license as 
constituting property protected by the Due Process Clause. From these cases, it can be concluded 
that licences will be protected if it can be shown that they are required for the practice of one’s 
profession. 
 
A commercial licence will additionally only be protected under the due process clause if it is 
held by a private person or juristic person and not when it is held by the state. In Cleveland v 
United States,414 the Supreme Court found that a video poker license in the hands of the state 
does not qualify for constitutional protection.415 It reasoned that licenses that have not been 
                                                          
408 Goldberg v Kelly 397 U.S 254 (1970) at 263. 
409 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
410 Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare v Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
411 402 US 535 (1971). 
412 Bell v Burson 402 US 535 (1971) at 539. 
413 443 U.S. 55 (1979). 
414 531 U.S. 12 (2000). 
415 Cleveland v United States 531 U.S. 12 (2000) at 27. 
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issued by the state cannot qualify for constitutional property protection as the court does not 
refuse issuing the licence so as to derive a benefit but only does so for regulatory purposes.416 As 
such, the interest in question must be “property” in the hands of the party whose rights have been 
infringed before it can be protected from unprocedural interferences.417  
 
The Supreme Court has to date not had the opportunity to decide on the issue of the inclusion of 
liquor licenses within the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause. Various lower courts in 
differing states have, however, held that liquor licenses are indeed property protected by the Due 
Process Clause.418 American legal commentators propose that the determination of whether a 
particular liquor license is constitutionally protected should be done on a case by case basis and 
that courts should examine the rights given to the licensee in relation to a particular license. If the 
statute gives the holder an interest that has many of the characteristics of property, then, that 
interest should qualify for constitutional protection. 
 
Although the United States clearly has a very wide concept of property, this concept of property 
does not, however, embrace all forms of intangible property rights. It does not extend to every 
conceivable interest. In Paul v Davis,419 the Supreme Court held that “reputation alone, apart 
from some more tangible interests such as employment . . . [is not] by itself sufficient to invoke 
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause”.420 
 
   Conclusion 
 
In light of the discussion set out above it can be seen that constitutional meaning of property 
depends largely on the core purpose(s) for the protection of property within the particular 
jurisdiction. In terms of the European Convention on Human Rights, the protection of property 
within Article 1 Protocol 1 seeks to ensure that states are able to formulate and carry out policies 
and laws that may interfere with the private property rights when it is in the public interest to do 
                                                          
416 Cleveland v United States 531 U.S. 12 (2000) at 25-28. 
417 Cleveland v United States 531 U.S. 12 (2000) at 27. 
418 JJ Leonard “Liquor License – Privilege or Property” (1965) 40(2) Notre Dame Law Review 204. 
419 424 U.S 693 (1976). 
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so. At the same time, this article also seeks to safeguard the holder of property from interferences 
that are carried out in an arbitrary manner.  
 
The ECHR through its purposive interpretation of Article 1 Protocol 1 has extended the meaning 
of “possession” quite widely. It has extended the protection afforded by this article even to 
interests that have not vested and interests derived from public law. With regard to the latter, the 
ECHR unlike Germany and the United States of America has not limited this recognition to 
interests acquired through own effort; or in the case of licences, to interests that are necessary for 
the practice of one’s profession. Furthermore, under the EHCR, public law entitlements can be 
protected against both procedural and substantive interferences. This approach is more in line 
with Charles Reich’s vision for the protection of public law entitlements within the constitutional 
notion of property.  
 
Germany’s constitutional property right is interpreted in light of its values, and as such it is also 
interpreted purposively. Like the EHCR, Article 14 of the Basic Law protects the individual 
property holder whilst also authorising the state to interfere with property rights where such an 
interference is in the public interest. The protection that the individual is entitled to as per Article 
14, however, is not the protection of the economic value of the interest per se. Instead, the 
individual’s property interest is protected so as to ensure that they live a self-fulfilling and 
dignified life. When deciding whether an interest can qualify for protection as constitutional 
property, the German Federal Constitutional Court has therefore had to assess whether it is 
capable of enabling the individual to attain self-realisation. An interest may not qualify for 
protection if it serves a more public interest purpose than a private purpose.  
 
Insofar as public law entitlements are concerned, though the German Federal Constitutional 
Court has included them within the constitutional concept of property, it has placed additional 
requirements for their inclusion. A public law entitlement will only be included within the 
constitutional concept of property if you can exclude another, it has been acquired through your 
own effort and if it is necessary for your survival. From these requirements, it is clear that 
welfare entitlements are protected as constitutional property in the German context as they are 
not attained though own effort. The inclusion of public law entitlements within the constitutional 
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notion of property therefore only extends to interest such as contributory pensions and medical 
insurance which are attained through own effort. These interests are protected from both 
procedural and substantive violations. 
 
The United States has also adopted a very broad constitutional concept of property, but this is not 
surprising as it has a very broad private law concept of property. Due to the fact that private law, 
which is the starting point for constitutional property, has such a wide meaning of property, the 
Supreme Court in its resolution of property disputes has not focused on the interpretation of the 
meaning of “property”. It has, however, extended the protection of constitutional property under 
the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause to various intangible interests including rights 
such as an easement, which would arguably not be protected under the German constitutional 
concept of property on the basis that it serves a more public law function. The extension of the 
American notion of constitutional property is a consequence of property being regarded as a 
commodity. Constitutional protection of property therefore serves the purpose of ensuring that 
the property holder’s economic freedom is not interfered with either through unprocedural 
violations of this right or deprivations that are not adequately compensated. 
 
Constitutional protection of property in the United States has been extended to both contributory 
and non-contributory welfare interests as well as licences where the licence is necessary for the 
practice of one’s profession. Inasmuch as the United States of America has extended its 
constitutional concept of property to include these interests, it has only offered limited protection 
to holders of such interests. These interest can only be protected under the Due Process Clause 
and not under the Takings Clause. As such, they are only protected from procedural violations; 
the holder cannot claim that the state must compensate them where the state has withdrawn such 
an interest in a manner that satisfies the procedural requirements. 
 
The comparative discussion shows that there is no universal meaning of property. Different 
foreign jurisdictions have adopted varying approaches to determining whether an interest is 
included or excluded from their constitutional notion of property. The approach taken in the 
different jurisdictions is however often informed by the core purpose of the constitutional 
protection of property as well as other contextual issues. As such the European Court of Human 
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Rights, the German Federal Constitutional Court and the United States Supreme Court have all 
reached different conclusions with regard to the kinds of public law entitlements that are 
included within their constitutional notion of property as well as the reasons for inclusion or 





























CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
  Introduction 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to critically analyse the constitutional concept of property in light 
of the decision reached in the Shoprite Checkers case. In casu, the Constitutional Court found 
that a liquor license qualifies for protection under section 25 of the Constitution.421  
 
The research questions that have been addressed in this thesis are set out in the introductory 
chapter and they are (a) to set out and discuss the manner in which the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted and applied sections 25(1) and (2), (b) to set out and discuss the different approaches 
adopted in Shoprite Checkers and (c) to compare and contrast the different approaches adopted 
in Shoprite Checkers with approaches in comparable jurisdictions.422 Chapter two of this thesis 
then gives an overview of section 25; that is how South African courts have interpreted the 
constitutional concepts of a deprivation and an expropriation, as well as the element of public 
interest/ purpose.423  
 
In chapter three, the thesis then deals with the concept of constitutional “property”.424 The thesis 
in this chapter investigates how the courts have distinguished the constitutional notion of 
property from its private law counterpart and how the meaning of this concept has been 
developed beyond the confines of what private law deems as property.425 Chapter four then 
focuses on the Shoprite Checkers case with particular focus on the three judgments made by the 
Constitutional Court in casu.426 Having dealt with the South African approach to constitutional 
property, chapter five then investigates the approaches that have been adopted in foreign 
jurisdictions (European Union, United States of America and Germany) especially with regard to 
the inclusion of liquor licenses within the constitutional notion of property.427 
                                                          
421 See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) 
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 In this final chapter, it will be argued that there was no need for the Constitutional Court to 
extend the constitutional concept of property to include commercial licenses because these 
interests are protected under section 22 of the Constitution. This argument’s starting point is the 
insightful analysis of the Shoprite Checkers judgment by Van der Walt who makes a number of 
points which are significant for the purposes of this thesis. Perhaps the most important of these 
relate to Charles Reich’s notion of “new property”.428 
 
As we have already seen in Chapter Five, Reich argued that one of the key features of the 
modern welfare state is that it confers a wide range of public law entitlements on its citizens. 
Despite the fact that these public law entitlements have become an important part of a citizen’s 
wealth,429 he argued further, the state has a broad discretion to interfere with them. It could, for 
example, revoke them without notice or a hearing.430 In order to limit the state’s discretionary 
powers to interfere with these public law entitlements, he went on to argue, they should be 
recognised as property for the purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.431 
 
In South Africa, and possibly other jurisdictions - as well, Van der Walt pointed out, the debate 
around the constitutional protection of public law entitlements has been confused by the failure 
to distinguish between the different categories of rights and interests that Reich included in the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
notion of “new property”. A careful examination of Reich’s article and subsequent jurisprudence 
shows that a distinction may be drawn between at least four categories of “new property”, 
namely: intellectual property rights; personal rights; social and welfare grants that are grounded 
in own effort; social and welfare grants that are not grounded in own effort; and licences, quotas 
and permits.432 
 
                                                          
428 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” Annual Survey (2015) at 10-11. 
429 CA Reich “The New Property” (1964) 73 Yale LJ at 738. 
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Intellectual property rights and personal rights, Van der Walt points out further, have been 
recognised as constitutional property by the Constitutional Court.433 This is not surprising given 
that these rights are recognised by the private law and also because they enjoy the characteristics 
of private law property referred to by Madlanga J in his concurring judgment, namely objective 
commercial value, transferability and the ability to endure for a long period of time.434  
 
Social and welfare rights that are grounded in own effort, such as salaries, bonuses, housing 
subsidies and pensions claimed by state employees have also been recognised as constitutional 
property by the courts, although not the Constitutional Court. In Transkei Public Servants 
Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa,435 for example, the Mthatha High 
Court held was of the view that a housing subsidy may be regarded as constitutional property. In 
Ex Parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal In re Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Bill of 
1995 the KwaZulu-Natal High Court appears to have treated conditions of service relating to 
payment as constitutional property.  
 
Again, this is not surprising given that these rights usually arise out of a contract of employment 
and may thus be classified as personal rights. In addition, they also arise out of the state 
employees own effort. As indicated in Chapter Five, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
limits the inclusion of public law entitlements within the constitutional notion of property to 
interests in which one has exclusionary powers, attained through own effort and the interest must 
be necessary for their survival.  
 
Unlike intellectual property rights, personal rights and social and welfare rights that are grounded 
in own effort, Van der Walt goes on to point out, social and welfare rights that are not grounded 
in own effort should not be recognised as constitutional property. This is because, he argues, the 
“Constitution protects them directly and explicitly under other constitutional headings” such as 
section 27(1)(c) which provides that “[e]veryone has to the right to have access to social security, 
                                                          
433 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” Annual Survey (2015) at 10. 
434 In his main judgment, Froneman J also refers to the characteristics of private property. According to Froneman J 
these are that it must be valuable, exist for an indefinite period and capable of being transferred. See Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC); 
2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) at para 68. 
435 1995 (9) BCLR 1235 (Tk).  
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including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social 
assistance”.  
 
As indicated in Chapter Five, this approach is followed by the United States Supreme Court in 
respect of intellectual property rights and is constitution with the principle of subsidiarity. This 
principle provides for a “bottom-to-top approach: the lower level of the hierarchy should in 
principle exhaust its capacity to contribute in a particular context before the higher level 
intervenes, either by taking over or providing assistance where the lower level has reached its 
limit.”436 This principle has also been applied in the South African context, the Constitutional 
Court has found that where there are “more particular, indirect constitutional norms applicable” 
then these should be relied on before one can rely on “more general, direct constitutional norms 
applicable.”437  
 
Although he does not do so himself, it is submitted that the argument made by Van der Walt in 
respect of social and welfare rights that are not grounded in own effort can also be made in 
respect of licences, quotas and permits, or at least in respect of liquor licences, namely that they 
should not be recognised as constitutional property because the Constitution protects them  
directly under other constitutional headings, namely the right to freedom of trade occupation and 
profession guaranteed in section 21 of the Constitution (in the case of citizens) and the principle 
of legality which forms a part of the rule of law guaranteed in section 1 (in the case of non-
citizens and juristic persons). 
 
This argument forms the focus of this final chapter. It is set out in two parts. The first part 
focuses on the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession guaranteed in section 21 and 
the second part focuses on the principle of legality. Each part will be discussed in turn. 
 
   The right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession 
 
  Introduction 
                                                          
436 M Murcott and W van der Westhuizen “The ebb and flow of the application of subsidiarity – critical reflectiions 
on Motau and My Vote Counts” (2015) 7 Constitutional Court Review at 46. 
437 M Murcott and W van der Westhuizen “The ebb and flow of the application of subsidiarity – critical reflectiions 




The right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession is guaranteed by section 22. This 
section provides that:  
 
“Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation 
or profession may be regulated by law.”  
 
This right was protected in the now repealed Interim Constitution in section 26.438 The protection 
afforded by section 22 goes beyond merely ensuring that one’s ability to provide for themselves 
financially is not affected.439 It also seeks to ensure that the individual lives a life that is 
“dignified and fulfilling”.440 This protection can be interfered with in two different ways. It could 
be that the person’s ability to choose their trade, occupation or profession is affected or a 
regulation may interfere with the way they exercise their right to choose their trade, occupation 
or profession freely. 
 
   The scope and ambit of the right 
 
a)   What is meant by the phrase “trade, occupation and profession”? 
 
Lagrange submits that the phrase “trade, occupation and profession” is “wide enough to cover all 
forms of economic activity anyone might engage in and should not be read restrictively”.441 This 
approach is also supported by Rautenbach who submits that, “The exclusion of ways in which to 
earn a living because they do not technically satisfy the contemporary definitions of ‘trades’, 
‘occupations’ and ‘professions’ could unnecessarily open up opportunities for arbitrary exclusion 
and would, in any case, most probably serve no practical purpose”.442 In City of Cape Town v AD 
Outpost,443 the Cape High Court was also of the view that any economic activity that enables one 
                                                          
438 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
439 I Currie and J de Waal  The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) at 465. 
440 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) at 465.  
441 R Lagrange “Economic activity rights” in H Cheadle and D Davis South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights (2013) at 17-2. 
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Meaningless Second Sentence of Section 22 of the Constitution” (2005) 4 TSAR at 854. 
443 2000 (2) BCLR 130 (C). 
97 
 
to earn a living is protected under this clause.444 There is clearly, much support for a wide 
interpretation of the economic interests that can be protected under this clause. 
 
Commercial trading licenses would also qualify for protection under this clause as they are 
required for the practise of some trades. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has dealt with a case 
which shows that these licenses are indeed protected under the right to freedom of trade, 
occupation and freedom. In S v Lawrence,445 The Constitutional Court considered whether 
statutory prohibitions related to a grocer’s wine license violated the appellants’ rights to freedom 
of trade, occupation and profession.446 
 
b)   What is meant by the term “citizen”? 
 
From the term “citizen” it is clear that this right can be relied on by natural persons who are 
South African citizens. High Court judgments have, however, found that this right is only 
applicable to natural persons.447 In City of Cape Town v AD Outpost (Pty) Ltd and Others448 the 
Judge was of the view that “section 22 introduces a Constitutional protection to be enjoyed by 
individual citizens as opposed to juristic bodies…It is not a provision which should be extended 
to the regulation of economic intercourse as undertaken by enterprises owned by juristic bodies 
which might otherwise fall within the description of economic activity.”449 
 
   The standard of review 
 
Where it is argued that the state has violated one’s right to freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession, the court in assessing whether there has been such a violation has often started by 
distinguishing between two types of violations. That is, legislation that interferes with one’s 
                                                          
444 City of Cape Town v AD Outpost 2000 (2) BCLR 130 (C) at para 59.  
445 [1997] ZACC 11; 1997 (10) BCLR 1348; 1997 (4) SA 1176. 
446 S v Lawrence, S v Negal; S v Solberg [1997] ZACC 11; 1997 (10) BCLR 1348; 1997 (4) SA 1176 at para 2. 
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Investments CC and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1997 (7) BCLR 925 (E) at 928 in this case, 
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448 2000 (2) BCLR 130 (C). 
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choice and legislation that interferences with the manner in which one practices their trade.450 
Interference with the choice or practice of a trade, occupation or profession can only be done 
through a law which applies generally and is both “accessible and precise”.451 Also, the 
legislation in question must only interfere with the choice or practice of a trade, occupation or 
freedom where this is in the public interest. This basically means that the legislation that 
regulates the choice or practice of a trade cannot do so arbitrarily.  
 
In cases where the violation of the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession results 
interferes with one’s choice of trade such as were a commercial license is withdrawn, leaving the 
holder of such a license incapable of practising his choice of trade, the court applies the stricter 
reasonableness test.452 This test for reasonableness is derived from the limitations clause.453 In 
cases where the interference only regulates the trade in question, the regulation will be subjected 
to the lower level rationality test to determine its constitutionality.454 
 
   The argument 
 
In light of the points set out, there appears to be no doubt that the phrase “trade, occupation and 
profession” is broad enough to include commercial licences and specifically liquor licences. 
Given this fact, it is submitted that in terms of the principle of subsidiarity it is not necessary to 
classify a liquor licence as constitutional property and the constitutional validity of the ECLA 
should have been tested against the provisions of section 21 rather than section 25. 
 
In this respect, two points may be made.  
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First, that in his main judgment Froneman J acknowledges that a liquor licence promotes the 
goals that underlie section 22. He thus appears to implicitly accept that a liquor licence may be 
protected by the provisions of section 22. He states in this respect that, in order for an interest to 
qualify for constitutional protection of property, the court must ascertain whether it is such that it 
is necessary for the achievement of self-realization. In the case of a liquor licence holder this 
self-fulfilment requirement will be satisfied if the holding of the license is necessary for the 
“running a business as work that forms part of “one’s identity and constitutive of one’s 
dignity”?  If it is, then, on the strength of the close correlation between the holding of the licence 
and the fundamental right to choose one’s trade or vocation, a finding that it is property for the 
purposes of section 25(1) is likely.”455 
 
Second, although the standards of review that apply when a person claims that his or her section 
22 rights have been infringed appear to be similar to those that apply when a person claims that 
his or her section 25 rights have been infringed,456 there are a number of reasons to apply section 
22 rather than section 25. Inasmuch as section 25 and section 22 both have at their low end the 
test for rationality, these provisions, however, have different goals which could lead to the courts 
applying differing tests even when faced with the same set of facts. Applying section 25 would 
also avoid the difficulties encountered by the courts in dealing with the issue of “property” and it 
would give the courts the opportunity to contribute to a deeper understanding of the right to 
freedom of trade, occupation and profession.   
Apart from the reasons given above, there is another important reason for excluding liquor 
licences from the definition of constitutional property and thus testing the provisions of the 
ECLA against section 22 and not section 25, namely that the freedoms guaranteed in section 22 
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are not granted to “everyone”. Instead, they are restricted to “citizens”. If liquor licences are 
included in the constitutional concept of property, then the decision taken by the drafters of the 
Constitution to restrict the freedoms guaranteed in section 22 to citizens only could easily be 
undermined. If a non-citizen or juristic person cannot successfully rely section 22, then a non-
citizen or juristic person cannot rely on section 25 to achieve the same goal. 
 
The fact that non-citizens and juristic persons cannot rely on section 22 or section 25 does not 
mean, however, that they do not enjoy any protection. This is because they can rely on the 
principle of legality. 
 
   The rule of law and the principle of legality 
 
   Introduction 
 
The principle of legality is rooted in the supremacy clause of the Constitution which states that 
“[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”.457 The principle of legality therefore 
applies to all law and all state actions. This would include laws which interfere with any 
commercial interests held by any person including juristic persons.  
 
The rule of law is one of the founding values of the Constitution; in section 1(c), the Constitution 
states that one of the founding values of the Constitution is “[s]upremacy of the Constitution and 
the rule of law”.458 
 
   The scope and ambit of the principle of legality 
 
In terms of the rule of law, all law and actions taken by the state must be rational.459 That is to 
say that; it must seek to achieve a legitimate public interest.460 The requirement for rationality is, 
however, the minimum requirement but the rule of law in other instances demands more than just 
                                                          
457 See section 2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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a rational link.461 In some instances, a law or action of the state will comply with the rule of law 
if it is not only rational but also non-arbitrary and procedurally fair.462  
 
The Constitutional Court explains the rule of law in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers463 where it 
states that:                                                           
 
“it is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by an executive and other functionaries 
should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, 
otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to pass 
constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by the executive and other functionaries must at least, comply 
with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short of the standards demanded by our Constitution for such action.”464 
 
In some cases, the courts have resolved matters on the principle of legality without actually 
evaluating the substantive issues and only considering whether the legislature or state body acted 
within the powers conferred upon it.465 In other cases, this principle has, however, been 
interpreted wide enough to allow the court to evaluate substantive issues.466 This wide approach 
has only been applied to cases dealing with the right of access to courts as well as cases which 
focus on “the law as a dispute resolution mechanism” – procedural fairness aspect of the 
principle of legality.467 
 
                                                          
From the above argument, it flows that the commercial licenses held by natural persons are best protected under the 
more specific clause which is the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession. This clause, however, 
appears to limit its protection to natural persons and thus would not protect the commercial licenses held by juristic 
persons. I argue that commercial licenses held by juristic persons are also adequately protected by the constitutional 
principles of legality and the rule of law and thus should not be protected under the property clause. 
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  The argument 
 
As pointed out above, even though non-citizens and juristic persons cannot rely on section 22 to 
protect their liquor licences, they can still rely on the principle of legality. A non-citizen or 
juristic person who is a holder of a license can argue that the state cannot pass laws or act in a 
manner that is arbitrary with regard to their interest. As a minimum standard, the state is only 
allowed to interfere with such interests where this is done so as to achieve a legitimate public 
purpose. Depending on the circumstances, the Court might also look into substantive issues to 
determine whether the regulations in question comply with the rule of law. As such, though 
commercial licenses protected by juristic persons would be adequately protected by the 
Constitution by means of the rule of law and the principle of legality. 
 
   A re-assessment of Moseneke DCJ’s judgment 
 
   Introduction 
 
Out of all three judgments, Moseneke DCJ’s judgment fits best with the arguments set out above. 
In addition, as Van der Walt points out, Moseneke DCJ is the only one who fully appreciated the 
radically regulated nature of licences. For these reasons, his judgment is the one I would support. 
Moseneke DCJ found that the grocer’s wine license held by Shoprite Checkers did not constitute 
constitutional property. In this respect, he argued that: 
 
“It is needless, I think, to characterise Shoprite’s grocer’s wine licence as constitutional property.  The same 
outcome may be arrived at without deciding the difficult and fluid question whether it is property.  It should suffice 
to test the challenged provisions for rationality.  In that event, one simply asks whether the provisions pursue a 
legitimate government purpose, and if so, whether the statutory means resorted to are arbitrary or reveal naked 
preference or another illogical or irrational trait.  In substance the arbitrariness enquiry here would, in process and 
substance, be no different from the arbitrariness enquiry under section 25(1).”468 
 
The Deputy Chief Justice also pointed out that foreign jurisdictions have adopted different 
stances with regard to the protection of public law entitlements within the constitutional notion 
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of property.469 He pointed out that in Germany, though the courts had extended the constitutional 
notion of property to include welfare entitlements, they did not include all forms of welfare 
entitlements within their notion of constitutional property.470 South Africa, had to exercise the 
same caution according to the Deputy Chief Justice, the extension of the constitutional concept 
of property has to “be seen through the lenses of our history and constitutional scheme”.471 In the 
South African context there was no need to extend the constitutional concept of property to 
include liquor licenses.472 
 
The reasoning behind Moseneke’s view that liquor licenses need not be protected as 
constitutional property in the South African context was that:  
 
“Some jurisdictions have opted for an elastic notion of “property” in order to protect interests that are otherwise 
open to executive or legislative abuse.  Our Constitution is different.  It provides us with the widest possible 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.  It guarantees an impressive range of socio-economic 
entitlements.  What is more, all laws and conduct must be consistent with the Constitution and are open to judicial 
scrutiny.  We boast of administrative justice protections that are truly expansive and meant to police and curb 
executive excesses. Our jurisprudence need not convert every conceivable interest, with or without commercial 
value, as a few other jurisdictions have done, into protectable property.”473 
 
Moseneke DCJ was of the view that inasmuch as liquor licenses are public law entitlements they 
are quite different from other forms of entitlements and that these differences should be taken 
into account when deciding whether they should be regarded as constitutional property. Unlike 
other forms of public law entitlements, liquor licences were regulated more heavily because of 
the socio-economic challenges that can result from “access to and use” of liquor.474 It was 
therefore important to ensure that this regulatory function of the legislature, which is an inherent 
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feature of a liquor license, was not significantly interfered with by giving the holder strong 
protection under the property clause.475 Moreover, a very wide concept of constitutional property 
would not only “impermissibly limit the legislative competences of the provinces” but it would 
also result in a tighter…understanding of deprivation and arbitrariness.”476 
 
Over and above this, the nature of liquor licenses disqualified them from inclusion within the 
constitutional concept of property, per Moseneke DCJ.477 A liquor license could not be protected 
as “property” because: 
(a)  it is a “bare permission”;478  
(b)  it can be withdrawn or altered by the administrator;479  
(c)  it is “never absolute” and it is “never for the taking”;480  
(d)  the holder of the license may become unsuitable to hold it;481  
(e)  it is not freely transferrable;482 and  
(f)  it does not vest in its holder.483 
 
In his minority judgment, Moseneke DCJ argues that by resolving this matter on the basis of the 
rationality principle, the Constitutional Court would have reached the same outcome without the 
difficulties of deciding on the issue of property. He argued that “the inquiry into arbitrary 
deprivation in substance is no different from the enquiry into rationality of the impugned 
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statute.”484 Like the arbitrary deprivation enquiry, the rationality test also seeks to establish that 
the relevant legislation has a legitimate public purpose.485 
 
  The principle of subsidiarity 
 
Moseneke DCJ’s judgment shows an appreciation of not only the “unique nature of licences” but 
also the unique nature of South Africa’s constitutional context.486  Moseneke DCJ makes a good 
point that where the Constitution through other rights gives adequate protection to a particular 
public law entitlement, then, the notion of constitutional property need not be extended to 
include such an entitlement. Charles Reich in arguing for the inclusion of the various forms of 
public law entitlements within the American constitutional notion of property, based his 
argument on the lack and inadequacy of the protection that these entitlements had under the 
American Constitution. The South African Constitution, as correctly pointed out by Moseneke 
DCJ, offers adequate protection to holders of commercial licenses. As such there is no need in 
the South African context to extend the constitutional concept of property to include commercial 
licenses. 
 
   Radically regulated interests 
 
Van der Walt points out that unlike Moseneke DCJ, Froneman J and Madlanga J failed to take 
into consideration the “unique nature of licences as radically regulated constitutional property.487 
Though commercial licences display some characteristics of traditional property and though all 
property is regulated, Van der Walt submits that “not all property is subject to the same kind of 
intensity of regulatory interference and amendment – a qualification that makes all the difference 
and is therefore crucial in case like this.”488 He was also of the view that when determining the 
inclusion of licenses within the constitutional notion of property courts should avoid placing 
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them under the broad and misleading category of “new property”.489 Instead, they should 
consider the nature of the license and determine whether the license in question needs to be 
protected under the property clause.490  
 
With regard to the nature of licenses Van der Walt stated that: 
 
“licenses (like many other forms of private property that is subject to extensive or radical wall-to-wall regulatory 
control) are particularly prone to what may be described as regulatory-regime changes – in other words, large scale, 
comprehensive amendments of the regulatory scheme of which they form part and from which they derive. 
Generally speaking, property that is wholly derived dependent on, or significantly limited by regulation, is not 
insulated against such regime changes – provided that the regime change is rationally justifiable, implemented fairly, 
and, in particular, softened by a reasonable set of transitional provisions. However, depending on a mixture of the 
particular features of the regulatory schemes of which it forms part, a particular licence can nevertheless vest in the 
beneficiary more or less clearly at a determinable point of in time, be more or less insulated against unilateral and 
arbitrary regulatory amendment and termination, and be more or less insulated against unilateral and arbitrary 
amendment and termination, and be more or less insulated freely transferrable and commercially valuable. 
Depending on the variations based on these considerations, specific interests should preferably be protected under 
section 25 or in terms of administrative justice.”491 
 
  Conclusion 
 
The interpretation of the meaning of property is a complex matter. More so, when it comes to 
public law entitlements. The failure of the Constitutional Court in earlier decisions to lay 
building blocks for the interpretation of the meaning of property, when it expanded the meaning 
of property, by engaging fully with this issue also contributed to these challenges. It was not until 
the decision in Shoprite Checkers that the Constitutional Court fully engaged with the issue of 
the meaning of constitutional property. Though the Court found that commercial licenses are 
constitutionally protected property, the Court was torn into three with regard to the approach to 
be used to interpret the meaning of “property” in a constitutional sense.  
 
                                                          
489 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” Annual Survey (2015) at 11. 
490 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” Annual Survey (2015) at 11. 
491 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” Annual Survey (2015) at 11.  
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It is submitted that the Constitutional Court did not, however, need to extend the constitutional 
concept of property to include commercial licenses. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, 
commercial licenses which are essential for the practice of one’s trade must instead be protected 
under the most specific right which is the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession. 
Though this right does not extend to juristic persons, commercial licences held by juristic 
persons are constitutionally protected through the rule of law and the principle of legality. These 
constitutional principles and the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession adequately 
protect commercial licenses and they would result in the same outcome reached in Shoprite 
Checkers but without the challenges that arose from the determination of whether these interests 
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